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Objectivity cannot be equated with mental blankness; rather,
objectivity resides in recognizing your preferences and then subjecting
them to especially harsh scrutiny—and also in a willingness to revise
or abandon your theories when the tests fail (as they usually do).
1
—Stephen Jay Gould
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INTRODUCTION
In 1953, philosopher Isaiah Berlin used the fox/hedgehog
2
distinction to describe and explain the life and work of Leo Tolstoy.
The dichotomy, attributed to the Greek warrior/poet Archilochus,
goes something like this: “The fox knows many things, but the
3
hedgehog knows one big thing.” Berlin described Tolstoy as a fox—
2. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Hedgehog and the Fox, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 436, 436 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., Farrar,
Straus and Giroux 1998).
3. Id. Others translate the quote differently: “[F]oxes ‘pursue many ends, often
unrelated and even contradictory.’” Jonathan L. Entin, Peter Junger: Scholar and
Stylist, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319, 319 (2008). Entin describes a discourse in which
Professor Junger called himself a fox, in contrast to “the Great Hedgehog,” Richard
Posner. Id. at 323.
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fascinated by a variety of people and things—who sought to be a
4
hedgehog—consumed and motivated by a central, single vision.
More than fifty years later, in 2005, Philip Tetlock applied the same
5
distinction to the cognitive approaches of political forecasters: those
with unwavering commitment to a single world-view (hedgehogs) as
opposed to those with a more open-minded cognitive approach who
6
tend to see alternative explanations and embrace ambiguity (foxes).
Tetlock concluded that the fox is typically the better political
forecaster, although the hedgehog is commendable because she
7
persists in a particular view.
In this Article, I borrow the distinction and apply it to expert
witnesses at trial. Whatever type of expert, whether scientific,
nonscientific, academic, or experiential, according to Berlin’s
dichotomy, the hedgehog tends toward a single, central view of the
8
world; she approaches this view with unwavering commitment.
The fox sees the gray, tending toward self-doubt about her view and
9
always considering alternative explanations. As Stephen Jay Gould
emphasized, neither is “better” because both intellectual styles are
10
valuable and necessary in the pursuit and development of ideas.
I apply the distinction to a narrow category of cases and to one
particular expert witness, Evan Kohlmann, who has testified
repeatedly for the government in criminal cases against alleged
11
terrorists.
I posit that Kohlmann is a hedgehog-type expert,
4. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 436, 438.
5. Stephen Jay Gould also uses the distinction in his book about interactions
between the sciences and humanities. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE HEDGEHOG, THE FOX,
AND THE MAGISTER’S POX: MENDING THE GAP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES
5–6 (2003).
6. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW
CAN WE KNOW? 2 (2005) (discussing the benefits of experts with fox-like traits as
opposed to those with more hedgehog-like traits).
7. Id. at 19–24. Tetlock does not identify individual forecasters; rather, he uses
events such as the fall of the Soviet Union, id. at 107–08, the 2000 presidential
election, id. at 133–34, and the collapse of communist regimes in North Korea and
Cuba, id. at 96–97, to illustrate how well the forecasters as a group on each side of
the continuum fared in terms of accuracy.
8. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 436–37.
9. Id.
10. GOULD, supra note 5, at 5–6.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, 285 F. App’x 784, 792 (2d Cir. 2008), cert denied,
129 S. Ct. 173 (2009); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 305 (4th Cir. 2008),
cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009); United States v. Paracha, 313 F. App’x 347, 351
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Sadequee, No. 1:06-Cr-147-WSD, 2009 WL 3785566,
at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2009); United States v. El-Hindi, No. 3:06 Cr 719, 2009 WL
1373268, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2009); United States v. Kassir, No. S2 04 Cr
356(JFK), 2009 WL 910767, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009); United States v. AbuJihaad, 600 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (D. Conn. 2009); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580
F. Supp. 2d 53, 59 n.5 (D.D.C. 2008), motion to vacate denied, 646 F. Supp. 2d 79
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motivated by unfaltering devotion to one big idea. Presumably, this
cognitive approach impacts not only Kohlmann’s conclusions but
12
also his method of arriving at his conclusions. Yet, despite potential
shortcomings in Kohlmann’s methodology stemming from this kind
13
of cognitive process, courts have readily, eagerly, and with very little
scrutiny admitted Kohlmann to testify as an expert witness in the
cases described herein.
14
This Article considers how the hedgehog-type expert fares in the
framework established by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
15
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert I). Many commentators have criticized
Daubert because, among other problems, the five typical Daubert
16
factors are ill-suited for social science. This Article takes a different
tack. Using the hedgehog/fox distinction, this Article shows that,
particularly in the social science arena, the expert most likely to
appeal to a court using the Daubert factors may be the least likely to
testify based on a reliable social science methodology.
Said
differently, how an expert thinks is as important to determining the
trustworthiness of that expert’s methodology as what that expert
thinks.

(D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669, 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008);
United States v. Sabir, No. S4 05 Cr 673(LAP), 2007 WL 1373184, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May
10, 2007); United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 4856865, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2007).
12. See GOULD, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing hedgehogs’ method of thought);
TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 2 (“What experts think matters far less than how they
think.”).
13. I never establish that Kohlmann’s methodology is unreliable or that his
conclusions are wrong, nor do I try to do so, as this is not my objective. Rather,
I contend that we have no way of knowing whether this type of testimony is reliable
because of shortcomings with Daubert as a gatekeeping tool. As illustrated in the
Article, I do suspect Kohlmann’s methodology is skewed by his hedgehog-type
thinking.
14. I focus in this Article on the hedgehog-type expert. The fox-type expert
presents issues as well, as foxes’ self-doubting, uncertain, prone-to-controversy
thought process would, presumably (and as described in more detail below), make
this expert unattractive to courts. In the arena of scientific expertise, commentators
have already described how courts “idealize” scientific testimony and thus tend to
exclude experts who express doubt and uncertainty. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H.
LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAW 2–4, 15 (2006)
(explaining how the idealization of science can prevent judges and other legal
commentators from critically assessing the limits of science). Caudill and LaRue do
not rely on the fox/hedgehog dichotomy (or on characteristics of the experts) but
rather on courts’ reaction to scientific experts who express uncertainty. Id. at 15.
15. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a
Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2294 (1994) (discussing the difficulty of applying
Daubert to nonscientific testimony).
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17

In Part I, I examine the Daubert/Rule 702 evidentiary reliability
standard and courts’ current practice and procedure, illustrating
what methods courts presently use to test for reliability. This Part
highlights the general, widespread inconsistency in how courts apply
Daubert with respect to two key aspects of Daubert gatekeeping:
(1) what factors make up the test, and (2) the degree of rigor with
which courts apply the factors. This Part provides background for
illustrating the peril of courts vetting a hedgehog-type expert’s
methodology using Daubert. As described herein, Daubert actually
serves to flatter the hedgehog-type expert, making the expert
especially attractive to courts.
Part II describes the fox/hedgehog distinction as applied to the
cognitive styles of experts and judges. In this Part, I narrow the focus
to a particular set of cases—criminal cases against alleged terrorists in
which the government routinely proffers, and courts routinely admit,
a hedgehog-type expert. I attempt to use the distinction as a lens
through which one may consider Daubert gatekeeping with a certain
type of expert. Generally, we think of Daubert’s effectiveness as it
relates to a particular category of cases or types of expertise (scientific
versus nonscientific or criminal versus civil). In this analysis, the
expert has a particular cognitive approach—a specific way of
processing information.
The expert’s cognitive approach
significantly impacts how a court should assess the expert’s
methodology for reliability. Ideally, it also calls for self-reflection on
the part of judges, who themselves tend to process information in
certain ways, and it calls for a different set of presumptions for courts
18
to apply when evaluating expert witnesses.
The hedgehog/fox dichotomy is best thought of as a continuum in
terms of cognitive approaches. In other words, it is unfair to describe
an expert as a complete hedgehog or a complete fox; rather some
19
have more hedgehog- or fox-like characteristics.
The fox-type
expert, if studied using the same paradigm (holding this type of
17. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (outlining various requirements that must be met before
testimony by experts can be admitted).
18. How judges process information in their decision-making is not the essence
of this Article. Yet, how judges think also impacts the phenomenon (and remedies)
described in this Article. See generally Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial
Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998); Tobin Sparling, Through Different Lenses:
Using Psychology to Assess Popular Criticism of the Judiciary from the Public’s Perspective,
19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2010).
19. See TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 87 (“Berlin recognized that few fit the ideal-type
template of fox or hedgehog. Most of us are hybrids, awkward hedge-fox and foxhog amalgams.”).
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cognitive process up against the Daubert framework) would probably
reveal the same set of issues. This highlights why effective judicial
gatekeeping should include exploring the expert’s methodology,
including, specifically, how the expert thought about the issues.
Ultimately, in Part III, I propose a revamped and rejuvenated
Daubert standard for testing social science and nonscientific
testimony. The changes are meant to remedy the problem of courts’
reluctance and/or inability (for varying reasons) to carefully review
20
expert methodology. As part of this proposal, I recommend that
courts, in exercising their gatekeeping function, add certain
presumptions and eliminate some existing presumptions to better
assess not just what an expert is thinking but how the expert arrived
at a theory.
Obviously, some may criticize the use of the hedgehog/fox
distinction as clumsy and simplistic. Actually, Isaiah Berlin agreed
that “if pressed,” the dichotomy could become “artificial, scholastic
21
and ultimately absurd.” Yet, he counseled that the dichotomy could
also prove beneficial:
But if it is not an aid to serious criticism, neither should it be
rejected as being merely superficial or frivolous; like all distinctions
which embody any degree of truth, it offers a point of view from
which to look and compare, a starting-point for genuine
22
investigation.

Here, the distinction is used as a novel way of examining Daubert
gatekeeping; as Berlin suggests, it provides a valuable investigative
tool for this task.
I.

THE BASIC TENETS OF TRIAL COURT GATEKEEPING
UNDER DAUBERT

The point of this Article is not that Daubert is flawed but rather that
shortcomings in our federal gatekeeping scheme are exacerbated
when parties proffer experts who possess certain traits, specifically
particular cognitive approaches. Essentially, the test becomes largely
ineffective with the hedgehog-type expert because Daubert actually
masks potential flaws in this type of expert’s methods. As this Article
explains, the “one-big-idea” type expert is especially appealing to
20. The proposed solutions would certainly apply with equal force to a scientific
expert (who could also be a hedgehog). The only difference is that with certain
hard-science expertise, the methodology would involve testing and replicating a test,
so the trustworthiness of the expert’s method would have some internal checks.
21. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 437.
22. Id.
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courts. However, the Daubert test is not effective at assessing the
reliability of this expert’s methodology.
In 1994, soon after the Supreme Court decided Daubert, Professor
Edward Imwinkelried urged courts and commentators to proceed
from the objective validation standards for scientific testimony in
Daubert to “the development of objective validation standards for
23
nonscientific opinion,” which, according to Imwinkelried, would be
24
difficult but was “both vital and feasible.”
Yet, sixteen years after Daubert, neither the Supreme Court nor the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee has crafted a reliability standard
for expert opinions involving social or soft sciences, or wholly
nonscientific testimony. Such a standard is lacking even after the
Court expressly included all expert testimony—not just scientific
testimony—within the scope of courts’ gatekeeping role in Kumho
25
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, and after the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee amended Rule 702 to incorporate the Daubert and Kumho
26
rulings.
Courts still cling to the scientifically grounded Daubert
factors, sometimes merely giving Daubert lip service, even when the
expert is a historian, political scientist, sociologist, or anthropologist,
27
for whose testimony the factors are ill-suited.
Accordingly,
as Imwinkelried foretold, Daubert gatekeeping for social science and
nonscientific experts reflects courts’ “laissez-faire attitude toward the
reliability of the propositions underlying nonscientific expert
28
testimony.” The absence of suitable factors for ensuring reliability

23. Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2294.
24. Id.
25. See 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (making no distinction for purposes of the
courts’ gatekeeping obligation “between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or
‘other specialized’ knowledge”).
26. The Court decided a third case, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997), which became part of the Daubert trilogy.
27. By nonscientific experts, I mean experts whose field does not involve the
hard or soft sciences. These experts are formally educated or trained and are
working or teaching in fields such as history, sociology, anthropology, music, law,
and linguistics. See, e.g., Wayne v. Shadowen, 15 F. App’x 271, 285 n.24 (6th Cir.
2001) (considering an expert affidavit by a music teacher); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l
Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1165–66 (D. Colo. 2006) (discussing a historian’s expert
report). Obviously, the expertise of certain types of nonscientific experts, like
accountants and bankers, is more “technical” and is thus subject to more objective
verification or validation than other expertise. See, e.g., United States v. Hermanek,
289 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Daubert factors to an investigator
testifying on the coded meanings of words in the narcotics trade); Okerlund v.
United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 341, 346 (2002) (applying the Daubert factors to an expert
on valuation, whose qualifications were in business economics and finance).
28. Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2280–81.
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of nonscientific expert opinions results in no real judicial
29
gatekeeping at all.
Now, sixteen years after Imwinkelried suggested that the Court
design a standard for social science and nonscientific testimony,
courts’ gatekeeping with respect to evidentiary reliability of
nonscientific testimony is haphazard in every respect. Certain federal
courts disregard the reliability requirement altogether (and focus
almost exclusively on qualifications) and other federal courts assess
reliability, but do so without a uniform standard or consistent degree
of rigor. Courts speak in Daubert language, yet their reliability
assessments do not track Daubert factors (which is understandable,
given that the factors are not well-suited to the task). The result is
that courts employ a cursory assessment rather than an “exacting
30
analysis.” Accordingly (and ironically), the courts’ review is often
most sketchy with nonscientific expertise, presumably because the
methodology is not scientific and is thus not subject to objective
validation, even though common sense would dictate stricter scrutiny
because of the absence of a known objectively verifiable
31
methodology.
Given the absence of a suitable gatekeeping test, the hedgehogtype expert, whose one big idea informs all her related ideas, and
who possesses strong qualifications stemming from her dogged
pursuit of this one big idea, tends to easily pass Daubert muster.
As shown below, evidence of the expert’s commitment to an idea
becomes confused with evidence of the expert’s careful and
methodical pursuit of the idea, which typically gets overlooked. As a
result, courts routinely admit this type of expert.
The problem of testing the reliability of expert testimony under
Daubert becomes even more pronounced when an expert relies
heavily on sources that are difficult to authenticate, such as Internet
sources. Under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert
29. Commentators argue that the courts’ misuse of Daubert supports the notion
that juries, rather than judges, should make reliability determinations. In other
words, if courts are just going to pay lip service to the test, why not allow the jury to
weigh the testimony instead of going through the motions of gatekeeping? See Note,
Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2142 (2003) (“[T]o the
extent that judges do not follow a reliable methodology in executing their
gatekeeping function, there is little guarantee that they will reach results superior to
those of a jury and little reason to accept the trustworthiness of their rulings.”).
30. See McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.
2002) (“Rulings on admissibility under Daubert inherently require the trial court to
conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered expert’s methodology.”).
31. Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2279 (“The very nature of scientific evidence
builds in some assurance of the accuracy of the testimony.”).
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can rely on inadmissible sources—such as websites and blogs—if the
sources are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
32
particular field in forming opinions.” For example, the “particular
field” relied on by the expert described in this Article—the very
current field of international terrorism since 9/11—requires
33
substantial reliance on Internet sources. Consequently, screening
the testimony of these experts for reliability is critical but is made
more difficult as a result of the absence of suitable Daubert factors.
This Part describes the Daubert standard, illustrating various
problems with courts’ current application of the gatekeeping test.
Section I.A addresses the standard itself, outlining the typical factors
and describing how courts often stray from these factors in their
attempts to add more fitting criteria or eliminate unhelpful criteria.
This Section also discusses the varying degrees of scrutiny that courts
use to assess an expert’s methodology. Section II.B briefly addresses
procedural issues regarding gatekeeping under Daubert.
This
background sets the stage for understanding why the hedgehog-type
expert is attractive to courts and, correspondingly, why she typically
gets admitted to testify as an expert even though courts fail to review
her methodology.
A. The Daubert Standard
In describing the Daubert standard, I address two aspects: (1) the
set of factors that courts typically rely on, and (2) the degree of rigor
that courts commonly use when applying these factors. As shown
below, courts sometimes stray from the traditional Daubert factors,
often without explaining the departure, and courts use varying
34
degrees of rigor when applying those factors. Accordingly, courts

32. FED. R. EVID. 703.
33. Evan Kohlmann, the expert described in this Article, relies heavily on
Internet sources in both his book and his expert witness reports. See EVAN
KOHLMANN, AL-QAIDA’S JIHAD IN EUROPE: THE AFGHAN-BOSNIAN NETWORK 144–45, 227
(2004) (drawing support from numerous Internet sources). In one of the cases
described below, United States v. Amawi, 541 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 2008), Judge
Carr referenced the expertise required to use the Internet to track terrorist
organizations—treating this, in itself, as a form of expertise. Id. at 949. Other courts
have not expressed the same concern for the expertise necessary to gather this type
of evidence.
34. According to one commentator, the “Daubert dicta”—Justice Blackmun’s
testing considerations—are “more common than the use of other indicia of
arguments about reliability,” yet “they appear in less than half of all such admissibility
decisions.” Robert Robinson, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and the Local
Construction of Reliability, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39, 64–65 (2009) (citing Christina
L. Studebaker & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Expert Testimony in the Courts:
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are all over the board in using Daubert to fulfill their gatekeeping
35
obligation.
1.

Factors
36
Federal courts currently use the test from Daubert, as applied to
nonscientific testimony in Kumho, to screen expert testimony for
37
admissibility. Daubert was meant to clarify Rule 702 of the Federal
38
Rules of Evidence, which governs the admissibility of expert
testimony. Rule 702 provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
39
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

The Influence of the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Decisions, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
251, 228 (2002)).
35. This Section is not meant to criticize Daubert because of courts’ inconsistency
of application. Others have done that. Rather, a basic understanding of Daubert is
necessary for illustrating my primary point that, given an expert who thinks a certain
way, the Daubert test may actually mask an unreliable methodology.
36. Many state courts have also adopted Daubert as the gatekeeping standard for
expert testimony. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5TH 453,
454–55 (2001) (determining that twenty-five states have adopted Daubert or a similar
test; fifteen states and the District of Columbia continue to use the Frye v. United States
“general acceptance” test; six states apply the Daubert factors with an emphasis on
Frye; and four states have created their own tests). The same issues discussed in this
Article would arise as courts apply Daubert in these states. See David E. Bernstein,
Keeping Junk Science out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 23 n.72 (2003) (listing
Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and
Washington as Frye states).
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); United
States v. Tucker, 345 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2003). In Daubert, the Supreme Court
rejected the prior “general acceptance” test for admissibility of expert witnesses
espousing scientific theories and instead adopted the list of nonexclusive factors—
including general acceptance—for deciding the reliability of expert testimony under
Rule 702. 509 U.S. at 589.
38. In 2000, the Federal Advisory Committee amended Rule 702 to comport with
Daubert and Kumho. The notes of the Advisory Committee explain that some types of
expert testimony are more “objectively verifiable” under the Daubert factors than
other types of testimony. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. The
committee concluded that with some testimony, the courts would have to rely on
“other standard principles attendant to the particular area of expertise.” Id.
39. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Courts describe the rule as identifying three necessary prongs for
admissibility: the expert must be qualified and her testimony must be
40
relevant and reliable.
The Supreme Court has advised trial courts to assess the reliability
of an expert’s theory using the following five factors: (1) whether the
theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (2)
whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant
scientific community; (3) whether the theory or technique has been
tested; (4) its known potential error rate; and (5) the existence and
41
maintenance of standards controlling its operation. In Daubert, the
Court expressly crafted these factors (which I refer to as the “typical”
42
Daubert factors) to fit a scientific methodology. Specifically, the goal
of Daubert was, in part, to assist judges in screening out “junk
43
science.”
Justice Blackmun repeatedly referred to the scientific
method: “In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony
pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary
44
reliability.”

40. See, e.g., Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530–31 (D.N.J.
2001) (“As configured in the Third Circuit, Daubert compels a three-part analysis:
(1) qualifications—whether the expert is qualified to speak with authority on the
subject at issue; (2) reliability—whether the expert’s methodology is sound and
whether his or her opinion is supported by ‘good grounds;’ and (3) fit—whether
there is a relevant ‘connection between the scientific research or test result to be
presented and particular disputed factual issues in the case.’” (quoting In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741–43 (3d Cir. 1994))).
41. See Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149–50 (1999) (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94).
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93.
43. See Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 n.6 (1997) (discussing phrenology
as the type of “junk science” meant to be excluded by Daubert); Mark S. Brodin,
Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 867, 871 (2005) (explaining that Daubert meant to rule out unreliable expert
testimony by doing away with the relevant scientific community standard).
One scholar described the events that preceded Daubert as follows:
In the mid and late 1980s, critics raised their voices in protest, saying that the
kind of expertise the courts regularly accepted as admissible was frankly
“junk” of scandalous lack of dependability. Voices protested the lack of
reliability in both criminal and civil spheres, but the voice that finally spoke
loudest and was heard most clearly, spoke almost exclusively of the injustice
of junk expertise used against civil defendants. I refer, of course, to Peter
Huber and his 1991 book, Galileo’s Revenge, which popularized the phrase
“junk science.”
D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 767–68 (2000).
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. In discussing Rule 702, Justice Blackmun said that
“[i]ts overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance
and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.” Id. at
594–95.
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In Kumho, the Supreme Court relied on the plain language of Rule
702 to apply the Daubert test to nonscientific areas where “technical
45
Justice Breyer
and other specialized knowledge” is required.
focused on the “knowledge” requirement of Rule 702: “[The rule’s]
language makes no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’
knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge. It makes
clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert
46
testimony.”
Accordingly, any expert testimony, whether hard
science, soft science, or nonscientific (experience-based or more
technical expertise), proffered in federal court or in a Daubert state is
47
now subject to Daubert gatekeeping.
The Supreme Court described the Daubert/Kumho standard as
liberal and permissive, giving courts wide latitude in terms of allowing
48
expert testimony and deciding how to test expert testimony. Justice
Breyer also emphasized the flexibility of the test, meaning that the
49
typical factors neither necessarily nor exclusively apply to every case.
50
The courts’ gatekeeping obligation is chock full of discretion. The
51
trial court has discretion to decide how to determine reliability, just as
it has discretion to determine the ultimate question of the reliability
52
of the conclusions reached.
Many criticize the standard for its
45. 526 U.S. at 141. Kumho involved personal injury claims against the maker
and distributor of a minivan tire sued after the tire blew out, causing the van to
overturn in a fatal accident. Id. The Supreme Court decision involved the
admissibility of testimony from the plaintiff’s expert, a mechanical engineer who had
conducted a visual and tactile inspection of the tires. Id. The Supreme Court made
clear that the Daubert test should be applied to all expert witnesses, including those
with technical and other specialized knowledge, not just to those with scientific
evidence. Id. at 148–49.
46. Id. at 147.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 150 (describing the Daubert test as flexible and inclusive). But see
Daniel D. Blinka, Expert Testimony and the Relevancy Rule in the Age of Daubert,
90 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 187–88 (2006) (“[D]espite its promised ‘flexibility’ and the
purported lowering of barriers to expert assistance, the federal reliability rule’s
application ‘has been anything but liberal or relaxed’ as trial courts strictly scrutinize
expert testimony . . . .” (quoting Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 691
(N.C. 2004))).
49. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.
50. See id. (relying on Daubert for the notion that the typical factors do not
constitute a “definitive checklist or test”).
51. In terms of the reliability part of gatekeeping, Judge Harvey Brown suggests
that courts admit experts whose testimony satisfies three reliability gates: connective,
foundational, and methodological reliability. See Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert
Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 748–51 (1999). Judge Brown posits that without all
three, the expert should not be admitted. Id. at 749. Although courts have not
adopted this classification, I rely on it later to propose a more fitting gatekeeping
standard for the experts described in this Article.
52. See Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (adding to the gatekeeping
test the court’s role in assessing the reliability of the ultimate conclusion by allowing
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permissiveness, while some complain that it is too stringent.
Others complain about the inconsistency in courts’ application of the
55
test.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has admitted expert
56
testimony “even though multiple Daubert factors were not satisfied.”
Courts at times add factors (some very broadly phrased and some
specific) to the typical Daubert list. These “other” gatekeeping factors
may include the following: whether too great an analytical gap exists
57
between data and opinion; whether the expert has employed the
same rigor in reaching her litigation-related opinion as she would in
58
the non-litigation arena; whether the expert accounted for obvious
59
alternative explanations; and whether the expert conducted the

the court to determine that a conclusion makes too large a leap from the supporting
data).
53. In her note concerning judicial confusion over Daubert, Cassandra Welch
identified differences in how the circuits and various judges apply Daubert. Cassandra
H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion,
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1097–98 (2006). She notes that while the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit requires that trial courts “consider all factors listed
by Daubert as well as any other relevant factors,” the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits use the Daubert factors like the hearsay exception for
business records. Id.
54. See Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining ‘Reliable’
Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 321 (2000) (criticizing Daubert’s
stringency and lack of clarity for leading to conflicting and confusing decisions);
Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L.
REV. 281, 283 (2007) (citing the 2001 RAND Institute for Civil Justice study of 400
federal court decisions regarding Daubert to support the notion that “[t]he
gatekeeping role bestowed upon the judiciary has blocked more court access than it
has enabled”).
55. See Robinson, supra note 34, at 42 (“Law is most effective in guiding judicial
behavior when the law has a relatively clear rule, a relatively clear substantive
meaning, or where judges face meaningful appellate oversight. Daubert decisions fit
none of these criteria.”); Welch, supra note 53, at 1098–99 (describing how judges
are unclear on how to weigh and combine the factors, noting a judicial survey in
which half of those who responded were weighing general acceptance the most
heavily out of all the factors).
56. See United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 269–71 (5th Cir. 2000)) (holding that
testimony may be admissible even if it does not satisfy two of the four or five factors).
57. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony linking
deaths among workers to chemical exposure, thereby validating the district court’s
reasoning that the gap between the data and the expert opinion was too great).
58. This is simply the Daubert concept of employing intellectual rigor articulated
as a specific factor. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993).
59. See, e.g., Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994)
(discussing efforts to rule out other possible causes of injuries).
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60

research independent of litigation.
Courts display significant
inconsistency in electing when (i.e., in what type of case, with what
type of expert, etc.) to reach outside the typical Daubert factors; also,
courts rarely explain their reasons for doing so.
At times, courts simply conflate the qualifications and reliability
requirements, looking at observations, professional experience,
61
education, and training as indicia of reliability. In some decisions,
emphasizing qualifications while barely addressing methodology
appears deliberate. In fact, Judge Harvey Brown posits that courts
should rely primarily on qualifications as a reliability factor when the
expert’s specialized knowledge derives from experience rather than
62
from a particular methodology. He cites Professor Imwinkelried for
the idea that “for experience-based expert testimony, reliability
63
should focus on the breadth of the expert’s detailed experiences.”
And while this certainly makes sense, using observations and training
as indicia of reliability for certain types of expertise (e.g., the police
investigator testifying as an expert about a criminal modus operandi
based on the officer’s thirty years of experience and training), the
court should still examine the expert’s methodology and explain the
court’s reason for leaning so heavily on qualifications to decide
reliability.
Ultimately, the reliability of an expert’s methodology is critical to
the trustworthiness of her conclusions; yet, courts often fail to
scrutinize it, particularly when the nature of the expertise is foreign
60. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)
(describing this issue as “a very significant fact to be considered”).
61. Commentators argue that for certain types of expertise, these factors are
much more suitable for testing the reliability of methodology than are the four
“typical” factors because of trial courts’ idealized views of hard sciences. David S.
Caudill & Lewis L. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know about
the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of Science,
45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003); see In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 n.8
(3d Cir. 1994) (listing the qualifications of the expert as one of the factors for
determining the reliability of scientific evidence in the Third Circuit).
62. See Brown, supra note 51, at 830. Judge Brown identifies eight gates through
which an expert’s testimony must pass for admissibility. The testimony must satisfy
the following tests: (1) assist the trier of fact; (2) pass the qualifications requirement;
(3) satisfy the relevance test; (4) pass the reliability test in terms of methodology
(“methodological reliability”); (5) satisfy the “connective reliability” requirement by
ensuring that the connection between the opinion and the conclusion is sound;
(6) pass the “foundational reliability” test by ensuring the foundation underlying an
expert’s opinion is reliable; (7) satisfy the “foundational data” reliability test; and
(8) pass the “unfair prejudice” test. Id. at 746–51. He identifies three separate
reliability gates: foundational, methodological, and connective. Id. at 828–29.
63. Id. at 834 (citing Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2292). Brown’s position is
essentially that these experts are not employing a methodology for a particular case,
as opposed to technical experts.
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64

to the court. The obvious irony is that the more elusive the nature
of expertise (thus suggesting the need for an exacting analysis), the
more lax the courts’ scrutiny of methodology.
2.

Degrees of Rigor
The second troubling aspect of Daubert is the varying degrees of
rigor with which trial courts currently apply the standard. To fulfill
their gatekeeping obligation, some courts treat the standard as
exacting, while other courts gloss over the factors, paying only scant
attention to whether the methodology satisfies any test.
In addition, some courts look to the “types” of experts and apply
the reliability test to the type, rather than to the individual expert’s
methodology. I use the phrase “categorical review” to describe a
review where courts evaluate a type of expert—a fingerprinting
expert, for example—and deem the type admissible without
65
analyzing the expert’s methodology. In United States v. Crisp, for
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit assessed
the reliability of fingerprinting experts in general, without assessing
66
the methodology of the government’s expert.
On appeal, the
defendant challenged the admission of the fingerprinting experts on
67
the grounds that fingerprint analysis had no established error rate.
The Fourth Circuit summarily rejected the argument, finding that
courts and other fingerprinting experts had routinely accepted this
type of expertise as reliable: “While [the defendant] may be correct
that further research, more searching scholarly review, and the
development of even more consistent professional standards is
desirable, he has offered us no reason to reject outright a form of
68
evidence that has so ably withstood the test of time.” In a strong
dissent, Judge Michael posited that the majority had improperly

64. See, e.g., infra Part II.B (surveying cases in which courts engaged in little or no
scrutiny of the expert’s methodology when admitting testimony concerning the
origins, operations, and ideology of terrorist networks).
65. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003).
66. See id. at 269 (“[T]he district court was well within its discretion in accepting
at face value the consensus of the expert and judicial communities that the
fingerprint identification technique is reliable.”).
67. Id. at 268.
68. Id. at 269. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit provides virtually
no review and shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that the expertise is not
reliable. See id.
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“grandfathered” fingerprint evidence, failing to analyze it under the
69
existing Daubert standard.
70
Similarly, in United States v. Williams, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit described, with approval, the lower court’s cursory
Daubert review, in which the trial court first noted the firearms
expert’s qualifications and then based its reliability determination on
those qualifications and the fact that the expert had testified in prior
71
cases. While describing the expert’s qualifications, the court noted
approvingly “her prior expert testimony on between 20 and 30
72
occasions.”
The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court’s
reasoning, making the confusing statement: “The trial court’s
admission of Kuehner’s testimony constituted an implicit
73
determination that there was a sufficient basis for doing so.”
In similarly cursory reviews, some trial courts admit expert
testimony simply because the expert professes that her methodology
is reliable. In a decision out of the Western District of Texas, the
court found an expert’s methodology reliable because he had
co-authored two books in the pertinent field, and because he
“testified that his opinions are based on his knowledge as one of
ordinary skill in the art, and that he is ‘100 percent knowledgeable of
74
the opinions that are expressed.’”
As this Article discusses below, a number of courts have engaged in
a relaxed review of Kohlmann’s proposed testimony, focusing on his
qualifications and the magnitude of his collection of data regarding
75
international terrorism. Courts tend to rely heavily on the fact that
prior courts have admitted Kohlmann’s testimony, treating those
prior decisions as precedent for the court’s admissibility decision.
In contrast, in a “strict scrutiny” review, a trial court carefully
studies an expert’s methodology in the context of her field. For
76
example, in United States v. Masferrer, the trial court assessed the

69. Id. at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government failed to
prove that the expert identification evidence satisfied the Daubert standard or that it
was otherwise reliable).
70. 506 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2007).
71. Id. at 161–62.
72. Id. at 161.
73. Id. (qualifying the court’s opinion by stating that it should not be “taken as
saying that any proffered ballistic expert should be routinely admitted”).
74. See Oilfield Equip. Mktg., Inc. v. New Tech Sys., Inc., No. MO-02-CA-183, 2004
WL 5499507, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2004).
75. See infra Part II.B (surveying the scrutiny that courts have applied to the
proffered testimony of Kohlmann in terrorism cases).
76. 367 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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77

reliability of an expert on banking transactions. The expert was a
professor of international finance law, international trade law, and
78
The government hired the
international banking transactions.
expert to opine on a series of transactions; the expert would testify at
trial that the loans at issue were not independent transactions but
79
were instead swap exchanges.
In assessing the reliability of the expert’s methodology, the trial
court outlined what material the expert had reviewed and how he
80
had reached his conclusions.
The trial court also noted what
81
material the expert had not reviewed in arriving at his conclusions.
Based on these omissions, the trial court ruled that the expert was not
82
reliable. In doing so, the court conducted an “exacting analysis” of
the expert’s methodology, looking closely at how the expert arrived
at his conclusions. For better or worse, this assessment reflects an
entirely different gatekeeping standard than the standard employed
in the cases described above.
The purpose of this Article is not to identify which circuits are
applying rigorous review in which types of cases, but rather to
highlight the absence of a consistent standard. Courts differ both in
terms of factors used and degree of rigor applied, such that in some
cases, judges scrutinize expert methodology meticulously, while in
other decisions, judges relax their scrutiny, ignoring parts of the

77. Id. at 1375–76.
78. Id. at 1374.
79. Id. at 1375.
80. See id. at 1374–75 (identifying the exact materials used by the expert to
conduct his analysis, including trade slips, faxes, emails, and other internal
memoranda).
81. Id. at 1375. The trial court noted the specific material that the expert
omitted from his review:
[The expert] (1) did not look at the fundamentals of the loans or the
borrowers; (2) did not look at whether the loans were repaid; (3) did not
look at whether or not the OCC required reserves on these loans; (4) did not
look at whether any payments on these loans were affected by the
moratorium; (5) did not do other research on value; and (6) did not review
Hamilton Bank’s portfolio.
Id. (citations omitted).
82. See id. at 1375–76 (finding that “[the expert’s] proposed testimony [was]
merely conclusory, unreliable, and fail[ed] to specifically identify the methodology
or reasoning he used” to arrive at his conclusions).
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assessment or applying such mild scrutiny that it is almost absent.
84
The result is a standardless standard.
B. Procedure
1.

To Hear or Not to Hear
Generally, federal appellate courts do not require a Daubert
hearing, though some circuits require that the record reflect a trial
85
In a recent case involving a firearms
court’s Daubert findings.
identification expert, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial court
that a separate hearing concerning the Daubert challenge was not
86
necessary. According to the Second Circuit, before presenting the
expert to the jury, the government “provided an exhaustive
87
foundation for [the expert’s] expertise.” The court also highlighted
88
that the expert had testified on twenty to thirty prior occasions.

83. Again, an empirical study of which judges, in which types of cases (i.e., civil
or criminal), with which types of experts (i.e., soft or hard science), employ which
standards (and to what degree) is not the purpose of this Article. Yet, someone
could undertake such a study.
84. Commentators Kanner and Casey have criticized the exacting scrutiny that
some judges use in applying Daubert, objecting that Daubert has become a common
tool for keeping cases from going to trial:
Daubert, with its many criteria, allows a judge to focus on just one criteria,
weigh it unevenly, and use it to prevent expert testimony (in many cases
central to a plaintiff’s entire case) from reaching the courtroom. . . . With
remarkable speed, judges have gone far beyond throwing the clinical
ecologists out of the courtroom. Impressed by artful defense counsels’
smoke screens, they are now excluding testimony of well-regarded experts.
Kanner & Casey, supra note 54, at 306 (citations omitted). In light of this
commentary, Daubert comes across as an entirely different type of test. See Robinson,
supra note 34, at 68–69 (“[O]ne emerging scholarly consensus views federal courts as
taking a relatively liberal position in criminal cases (particularly where the state’s
evidence is concerned) while being much more restrictive in civil cases.”).
85. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit acknowledged that Daubert
probably requires some sort of preliminary determination of admissibility, but the
court has held that lower courts are not required to act sua sponte in making explicit
rulings on the record concerning expert testimony. See Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1,
4–5 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that the trial court need only “consider” making a
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony). The Fourth Circuit does not require
a hearing. See United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663 (D. Md. 2009) (“It is
clear that a court is not required to hold a hearing simply because a party has raised
a Daubert issue.”). Nor does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
See Oilfield Equip. Mktg., Inc. v. New Tech Sys., Inc., No. MO-02-CA-183, 2004 WL
5499507, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2004) (“A trial court is not required to hold a
Daubert hearing before ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence.”).
86. United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 162 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a
Daubert hearing).
87. Id. at 161.
88. Id.
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Thus, the trial court was not required to hold a separate Daubert
89
hearing.
Other appellate courts draw on a range of factors when
determining whether a Daubert hearing is necessary. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a Daubert trial is not
required where the expert has extensive experience and provides
90
relatively straightforward evidence that is easy to follow. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has held
that a trial court abuses its discretion in a criminal trial by not
holding a Daubert hearing before excluding expert testimony that is
91
heavily relied upon.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit takes a hybrid approach, requiring a Daubert hearing when a
92
party seeks to offer expert testimony on a complex issue. The court
also requires a Daubert hearing when an expert’s methodology is
difficult to determine and the expert’s conclusions thus cannot be
93
verified. Thus, certain circuits require greater accountability from
trial courts than other appellate courts. The trial courts in these
circuits must make specific findings on the record regarding the
94
reliability of the expert’s methodology. The appellate court can
then review the “sufficiently developed record” to ensure that the
95
trial court satisfied its gatekeeping requirement. Accordingly, while
these circuits do not require a separate Daubert hearing, trial courts
must make sufficient findings on the record to (presumably) allow
89. Id. at 162.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 514–15 (9th Cir.
2008) (explaining that the testimony from the expert—a border patrol agent—
“was neither rocket science nor complex statistical modeling”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1021 (2009).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that the trial court should have held a Daubert hearing on the reliability
of eyewitness identification where the prosecution’s case relied almost entirely on
eyewitness accounts).
92. See, e.g., Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711–12 (W.D. Pa.
2005) (noting that toxic exposure cases present many complex issues and that the
Third Circuit had required a Daubert hearing in similar circumstances (citing Padillas
v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 1999))).
93. See, e.g., Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 155 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting
that a Daubert hearing is necessary if the court is unable to determine how the expert
reached her opinion (citing Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir.
2000))).
94. See, e.g., Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Kumho
and Daubert make it clear that the [trial] court must, on the record, make some kind
of reliability determination.” (quoting United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209
(10th Cir. 2000))).
95. See, e.g., id. (concluding that the absence of detailed findings as to the
reliability of the expert testimony must lead the appellate court to find that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony).
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for meaningful appellate review.
Again, courts are afforded
discretion in deciding the procedures for Daubert decision-making.
2.

Proponent’s Burden
Courts also apply the proponent’s burden inconsistently. Pursuant
to Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 702, the party proffering an
expert witness must establish that the testimony is admissible (i.e., the
expert is qualified and the testimony is relevant and reliable) by a
96
preponderance of the evidence.
Although the burden lies with the proponent of the expert to
establish admissibility, courts frequently require the party challenging
the expert to establish the absence of reliability. For instance, in a
recent case involving faulty reporting of truck-driver backgrounds,
the plaintiff truck drivers called a political science professor to testify
97
as to the accuracy of reporting practices. In assessing the reliability
of the plaintiff’s expert’s methodology and conclusions, the trial
court admitted the expert, holding that the reliability question
should go to the weight of the expert’s testimony because the
defendant “[had] not demonstrated that the basis of [the expert’s]
opinion testimony [was] so unreliable in these areas that the
98
testimony should not be admitted.”
Accordingly, the trial court
admitted the testimony because the party challenging the expert had
not shown the absence of reliability (rather than requiring the
99
plaintiff to establish the reliability of the expert’s methodology).
Thus, in terms of general problems with Daubert gatekeeping, courts
tend to stray from the mandate that they impose the burden of
establishing admissibility on the expert’s proponent.
3.

Appellate Review
Today, in practice, appellate courts vary significantly in terms of
how searchingly they review trial court admissibility decisions. As
shown above, some appellate courts carefully examine the expert’s

96. FED. R. EVID. 104(a); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he
admissibility of all expert testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a).”);
Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Daubert
instructs us that the district court must determine admissibility under Rule 702 by
following the directions provided in Rule 104(a).”).
97. Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n v. Usis Commercial Serv., No. 04-cv01384-REB-CBS, 2006 WL 2164661, at *3–4 (D. Colo. July 31, 2006).
98. Id. at *4.
99. See id. (finding instead that areas of questionable reliability are “ripe for crossexamination”).
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methodology to decide whether the trial court got it right, while
101
others rubber-stamp the trial court’s decision.
In theory, appellate courts are to review trial court admissibility
decisions for abuse of discretion and sustain the decisions unless they
102
are manifestly erroneous.
Commentators have advocated for de
novo appellate review, arguing that such review would be more
103
meaningful and that it would promote uniformity with certain
104
Yet, this proposal is certainly not the panacea
“trans-case” issues.
for the problems described herein. Rather, it would merely shift the
problem from trial courts (which lack standards and guidance) to
appellate courts (which also lack standards and guidance), with the
added detriment of enormous inefficiency. Accordingly, I do not
advocate shifting to de novo review, but rather rejuvenating Daubert so
trial courts can (and will) adequately account for how an expert
approaches an issue.
This brings us to the fox and the hedgehog. As shown, the Daubert
factors were meant to fulfill a particular objective relating to
reliability of scientific expertise. Courts now apply these factors
(in varying forms and using varying degrees of rigor) to test reliability
of all types of expert testimony. Yet, when viewing expertise through
the lens of Berlin’s fox/hedgehog dichotomy, the factors are not only
100. See, e.g., Jahn v. Equine Svcs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 392–93 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding two veterinarian
experts’ testimony and finding instead that the experts’ opinions were “based on
undisputed objective medical facts” and “scientifically-based methodology” and
therefore admissible).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of testimony without a Daubert
hearing).
102. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997); Satcher v. Honda
Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992)).
103. As one hopeful scholar imagined:
Finally, a time may come when the courts rule that the abuse of discretion
standard used in reviewing admissibility may have to be changed to a de novo
review standard. De novo appellate decisions based on Daubert would allow
examination of the expert testimony, not merely the actions of the trial
judge, and thus provide a higher level of review in admissibility rulings.
Todd R. Samelman, Comment, Junk Science in Federal Courts: Judicial Understanding of
Scientific Principles, 6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 263, 271 (2001). But see CAUDILL & LARUE,
supra note 14, at 64–65 (contending that arguments for de novo review represent
“an idealization of appellate judges as the solution to the problem of bad science in
the courtroom”).
104. See Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of
Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 234 (2000) (“Thus, appellate courts should
review case-specific evidence rulings deferentially and trans-case scientific issues de
novo, and lower courts should treat appellate decisions on trans-case scientific issues
as they would holdings of law.”).
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ill-suited but also, at times, wholly at odds with the underlying
objectives of Daubert.
II. THE FOX, THE HEDGEHOG, AND BIAS: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE
HEDGEHOG (OR THE FOX) TESTIFIES AS AN EXPERT WITNESS
Berlin’s dichotomy shows why courts, to vet expert testimony
effectively, should consider how an expert thinks, rather than simply
105
what an expert thinks.
Berlin characterized Dante, Plato,
Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche as hedgehogs; he considered Shakespeare,
106
Aristotle, and Joyce to be foxes. He described the hedgehog types,
known for their dogged persistence, as those who “relate everything
to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or
107
articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel.”
Foxes, presumably because they are shrewd and cunning, “entertain
ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal; their thought is
scattered and diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the
108
essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects.”
I characterize Evan Kohlmann, the expert most frequently
proffered by the government in the group of cases this Article
describes below, as a hedgehog-type expert. Kohlmann has achieved
109
celebrity status as a specialist in tracking terrorists.
He runs a
counterterrorism blog, has authored a book on counterterrorism,
and frequently comments on NBC News about counterterrorism
110
issues.
Courts routinely admit Kohlmann to testify on the
background, origin, and structure of terrorist organizations, despite
forceful defense objections concerning the reliability of Kohlmann’s
methodology.

105. Cf. Eric Schurenberg, Why the Experts Missed the Crash, CNN MONEY.COM,
Feb. 18, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/17/pf/experts_Tetlock.moneymag/
index.htm?postversion=2009021808 (finding the fox/hedgehog distinction to be
predictive of the accuracy of economic and policy experts).
106. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 437.
107. Id. at 436.
108. Id. at 436–37.
109. See Robert Strauss, Terrorists Beware: Kohlmann Is on the Case, PENN LAW
JOURNAL, Fall 2006, http://www.law.upenn.edu/alumni/alumnijournal/Fall2006/
feature3/kohlmann.html (profiling Kohlmann as one of five “All-Star” graduates of
the University of Pennsylvania Law School for his work as an expert on counterterrorism). After the 9/11 attacks, Kohlmann said, “Doing a sort of scientific
research like I had and then seeing it on TV, well, it was completely different.
I turned to a classmate and said, ‘This is Osama Bin Laden, and I have to go do
something about it.’” Id.
110. Id.
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A. The Fox and the Hedgehog
In the early 1950s, philosopher Isaiah Berlin used the
111
fox/hedgehog distinction to illustrate different cognitive styles.
Berlin compared the hedgehog’s single, focused worldview and
vision, which informs all of its opinions, with the fox’s more diffuse,
112
cautious, and open-minded approach.
Foxes tend toward selfdoubt and are thus more likely to adjust their views as necessary,
113
while hedgehogs tend toward more extreme positions. In his essay,
Berlin posits that Leo Tolstoy was a fox who wanted to be a
114
hedgehog.
In the early 1990s, paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould applied the
fox/hedgehog distinction to his ideal of science and humanities
115
joining forces to achieve a greater good.
He described the
fox/hedgehog differences in intellectual approaches as follows:
Foxes (the great ones, not the shallow or showy grazers) owe their
reputation to a light (but truly entertaining) spread of real genius
across many fields of study, applying their varied skills to introduce
a key and novel fruit for other scholars to gather and improve . . . .
Hedgehogs (the great ones, not the pedants) locate one vitally
important mine, where their particular and truly special gifts
116
cannot be matched.

Gould did not favor one approach in his book; rather, he described
the virtues of both styles and expressed the ideal of the two
117
combined, like the ideal of science and humanities conjoined.
Professor Philip Tetlock used Berlin’s distinction to categorize two
different types of political forecasters: ones with a single, dominant
118
worldview and ones with a more scattered, diffuse view of things.
According to Tetlock, how forecasters approach an issue is a much
more significant factor in likelihood of success than education or
119
experience.
“The propensity of hedgehogs to push their favorite
first principles as far as possible, and sometimes beyond, arose on

111. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 436.
112. Id. at 436–37.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 438 (finding that the fox/hedgehog distinction between Tolstoy’s
nature and his beliefs was reflected most clearly in Tolstoy’s view of history).
115. Gould, supra note 1, at 5.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 5–6.
118. TETLOCK, supra note 6.
119. Id. at 106, 117–18; see also Schurenberg, supra note 105 (interviewing Philip
Tetlock about the results of his survey in which he tracked 82,000 predictions by 284
experts and assessed the validity of their responses).
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numerous occasions.”
He describes the virtues of the fox-like
approach (or the detriments to the hedgehog approach) as follows:
“Once many hedgehogs boarded a train of thought, they let it run
full throttle in one policy direction for extended stretches, with
minimal braking for obstacles that foxes took as signs they were on
121
the wrong track.”
Tetlock posits that hedgehogs—who are more apt to simply cast
aside contradictory evidence because it conflicts with their worldview,
without assessing how it may impact the analysis or why it is
contradictory—are more appealing to the media because of their
steadfast positions and their ability to articulate their positions in
122
compelling sound bites.
In the political forecasting arena, Tetlock has a bias: he favors the
123
fox for accuracy. Tetlock describes attributes of the fox in political
forecasting as follows:
“[F]oxes are still wary of grand
generalizations: they draw lessons from history that are riddled with
probabilistic loopholes and laced with contingencies and
124
paradoxes.” Foxes are more open-minded and willing to integrate
contrary evidence or approaches; thus, with regard to the USSR in
1988, Tetlock explained: “The greater emotional detachment of
foxes proved helpful during the endgame phase of the glasnost and
perestroika period. Some foxes had a remarkable flair for piecing
125
together discordant arguments . . . .”
Hedgehogs, on the other hand, “dig themselves into intellectual
126
holes.”
Yet, because of the hedgehogs’ eagerness for resolution
127
with a sure, simple answer, the media favors the hedgehog. Tetlock
posits that this is because “simple, decisive statements are easier to
128
package in sound bites.”
So, as Tetlock concludes, the attributes
that detract from their ability to accurately forecast the future make
129
hedgehogs appealing political pundits.

120. TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 89.
121. Id. at 100.
122. Id. at 119. In her review of Tetlock’s book, Ellen Goodman said this of media
experts: “In our media world, the more certain the expert, the more celebrated.
And yet the more celebrated, the more likely he or she is to be wrong.” Ellen
Goodman, Hedgehogs and Foxes, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 2005, at A19.
123. TETLOCK, supra note 6, at 117–18.
124. Id. at 144–45.
125. Id. at 107.
126. Id. at 118.
127. Id. at 119.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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In describing the end result, Tetlock concludes that while “[f]oxes
are not awe-inspiring forecasters,” they avoid “many of the big
mistakes that drive down the probability scores of hedgehogs to
130
approximate parity with dart-throwing chimps.”
Tetlock also
concludes that the fox is more often right—this expert is typically a
better predictor of political and economic outcomes because of her
131
more resilient approach.
I borrow Berlin’s classification—which Tetlock applies to experts in
the political-strategy arena—and apply it to nonscientific experts in
132
the courtroom arena. This dichotomy demonstrates, in a way that
is different than past illustrations, the peril of continuing to rely on
our existing Daubert gatekeeping system, and gives courts a reason to
take seriously the need to reconstruct Daubert. As shown below,
hedgehog-type experts like Kohlmann typically are compelling
witnesses for the media, the government, the jury, and—perhaps
most importantly—the judge, who typically admits this expert despite
Daubert objections regarding reliability and qualifications.
B. Evan Kohlmann—“Celebrity Expert”
Evan Kohlmann, who has been admitted to testify as the
government’s expert witness in at least fifteen terrorism trials in this
133
country, has been called “the Doogie Howser of terrorism” because
Kohlmann was relatively young when he became a popular, self-made
134
expert on this subject.
He refers to himself as a “private sector
International Terrorism Consultant who has spent over a decade
135
tracking Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations.”
Kohlmann has an undergraduate degree in international politics
from Georgetown University and a law degree from the University of
136
Pennsylvania Law School.
He contributes to the Counterterrorism
130. Id. at 118.
131. See Schurenberg, supra note 105 (“The better forecasters were like Berlin’s
foxes: self-critical, eclectic thinkers who were willing to update their beliefs when
faced with contrary evidence . . . .” (quoting Philip Tetlock in an interview)).
132. The distinction can also be applied to scientific experts. See GOULD, supra
note 5.
133. Global Terror Alert, About Evan Kohlmann, http://www.globalterroralert.
com/about/11-research-partners/8-about-evan-kohlmann.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2010).
134. See Tom Mills, Evan Kohlmann; the Doogie Howser of Terrorism?, SPINWATCH,
Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-mainmenu-8/74terror-spin/4850- (comparing Kohlmann to Doogie Howser, the main character in a
television sitcom about a boy who became a well-respected doctor when he was
fourteen years old).
135. Global Terror Alert, supra note 133.
136. Id.
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Blog and is “an exclusive on-air terrorism analyst for NBC News.”
Kohlmann wrote a book about terrorist networks in Bosnia while he
139
was in law school. In the United States (and possibly abroad), he is
140
something of a celebrity terrorism expert.
Kohlmann is also known for creating a video about al-Qaida that
141
The
the government uses during trials of Guantánamo prisoners.
ninety-minute video, called “The Al Qaeda Plan” (to make it
reminiscent of “the Nazi Plan” film used during the Nuremberg
trials), depicts, for example, mangled corpses after the 1998 U.S.
142
Embassy bombing in Kenya.
According to the military tribunal’s
chief prosecutor, Army Colonel Lawrence Morris, the film was meant
143
to stir emotions: “It is prejudicial, which is why we show it.”
I use the five cases below to illustrate the nature of Kohlmann’s
proposed testimony (based on his expert reports) and the typical
court scrutiny of Kohlmann’s methodology (their Daubert analysis)
before admitting him to testify. Courts have admitted Kohlmann to
testify in ten other federal court cases in this country, reviewing his
144
expertise in much the same way as in the cases described below.
Kohlmann’s expert reports reflect a single, unwavering worldview
concerning the structure, organization, and background of the
organizations he tracks, and (more importantly) the forces driving
the individuals, publications, and organizations associated with those
145
organizations.
Typically, the defendant in these cases is charged
with supporting (by supplying classified information to or providing
funding for) a particular terrorist source or organization, knowing or
146
intending that the support be used to kill United States nationals.
137. Counterterrorism Blog, http://counterterrorismblog.org/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2010). Kohlmann describes his blog as “[t]he first multi-expert blog
dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues.” Id.
138. Global Terror Alert, supra note 133.
139. EVAN KOHLMANN, AL-QAIDA’S JIHAD IN EUROPE: THE AFGHAN-BOSNIAN
NETWORK (Berg 2004).
140. Global Terror Alert, supra, note 133. Kohlmann has also testified as a
terrorism expert in cases in the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, and BosniaHerzegovina. Id.
141. Carol J. Williams, Guantanamo Jurors Shown Graphic Film on Al Qaeda, L.A.
TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A8 (noting that Kohlmann was paid $20,000 to produce the
film and $25,000 to appear before the war crimes tribunal).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Global Terror Alert, supra note 133 (noting that Kohlmann has provided
testimony in fifteen federal cases).
145. See generally EVAN F. KOHLMANN, EXPERT REPORT: U.S. V. HASSAN ABU JIHAAD
(2007), http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/abujihaadexpertreport.pdf.
146. Typically, these cases are prosecuted under the material support to terrorism
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000), which provides that “[w]hoever . . . knowingly
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In his expert reports, Kohlmann deftly links a particular Arabic
publication, website, or organization (typically the one the defendant
147
He then establishes
allegedly supported) to terrorist recruitment.
148
the link between recruiting terrorists and Osama Bin Laden.
And then, obviously, he links Bin Laden to the jihadist objective of
149
In these cases, Kohlmann repeatedly,
killing American nationals.
150
vividly, and emphatically highlights these connections throughout
his expert reports.
151
the government proffered
In United States v. Abu-Jihaad,
Kohlmann to testify in a case against defendant Hassan Abu-Jihaad
152
for supplying classified information to Azzam Publications. As part
of its burden, the government was required to prove that Abu-Jihaad
provided material support to Azzam Publications “knowing or
153
intending that the support be used to kill United States nationals.”
The government called Kohlmann to testify as to “the history,
structure, and goals of al Qaeda, the recruitment of Muslim fighters,
mujahideen activities in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan . . . and
154
the role of Azzam Publications among the mujahideen.”
Judge
Kravitz permitted Kohlmann’s testimony on these issues, but he
excluded any of Kohlmann’s testimony regarding the defendant
155
himself or his motivations.
In his nineteen-page expert report, Kohlmann identified Azzam
Publications as the “undisputed top mujahideen propaganda site on
156
the Internet,” describing it as follows:
Over time, several shadowy U.K.-based entities have gained
notorious reputations for independently translating Al-Qaida
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title,” id.
147. See, e.g., KOHLMANN, supra note 145, at 9 (linking Azzam Publications to
terrorist recruitment).
148. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing Azzam’s terrorist recruitment as furthering
al-Qaida’s goals as intended by Osama Bin Laden, Azzam, and others who formed
al-Qaida).
149. See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (noting the al-Qaida terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole).
150. The language in Kohlmann’s expert reports is not histrionic, though he
certainly uses language effectively to create vivid images of whatever he is describing.
151. 553 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Conn. 2008).
152. Allegedly, Azzam Publications played a role in disseminating information
supporting al-Qaida and the mujahideen. See id. at 124.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 123.
155. See id. at 127 (noting that Kohlmann should not testify directly about the
defendant’s motivations to order jihadi videos from Azzam Publications because it
would “usurp[] the jury’s function” (citing United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45,
54 (2d Cir. 2003))).
156. KOHLMANN, supra note 145, at 9.

662

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:635

multimedia and re-releasing videos in English for the purposes of
terrorist recruitment—but perhaps none more so than Azzam
Publications in London. Between approximately the years of 1996
and 2002, Azzam Publications reigned . . . featuring jihad training
manuals, interviews with Al-Qaida leaders and associates, and the
157
stories of many fallen jihadi ‘martyrs.’

Kohlmann described the relationship between the man Azzam
(whom Kohlmann identified as “overwhelmingly accepted and
158
revered as the ‘godfather’ of modern military jihad”) and his “top
student” Osama Bin Laden. And, providing background on al-Qaida,
he went on to describe a meeting convened by Osama Bin Laden:
Bin Laden and other Middle Eastern terrorist leaders in
attendance jointly agreed that ‘the ruling to kill the Americans and
their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do
159
it.’

Kohlmann included in his report the “final call” of Azzam:
“We shall continue the Jihad no matter how long the way is until the
last breath and the last beating of the pulse or we see the Islamic state
160
established.”
In terms of his methodology, Kohlmann included one paragraph at
the beginning of his expert report in Abu-Jihaad describing his
methods as follows:
As part of my research beginning in approximately 1997, I have
traveled overseas to interview known terrorist recruiters and
organizers (such as Abu Hamza al-Masri) and to attend
underground conferences and rallies; I have reviewed thousands of
open source documents; and, I have amassed one of the largest
digital collections of terrorist multimedia and propaganda in the
world. The open source documents in my collection include sworn
legal affidavits, original court exhibits, video and audio recordings,
161
text communiqués, and eyewitness testimonies.

Kohlmann went on to list the other cases in which he had testified
“as an approved expert witness” and quoted another court’s decision
162
admitting him to testify.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2.
159. Id. at 3 (citing Text of the World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews
and Crusaders, AL QUDS AL ARABI (London), Feb. 23, 1998).
160. Id. at 3 (citing Dr. Abdallah Azzam, Al-Qa’ida, AL-JIHAD, Apr. 1988, No. 41, at
46).
161. Id. at 1.
162. See id. at 1–2 (“Evan Kohlmann has sufficient education, training and
knowledge to be qualified as an expert . . . [his] methodology [consists] of gathering
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In assessing the reliability of Kohlmann’s testimony, Judge Kravitz
noted that Kohlmann was “relatively young to be an expert,” yet
“he applies to his expert testimony the same social science
methodologies that he learned at Georgetown University and that are
163
applied to other subjects that cannot be tested scientifically.”
Judge Kravitz did not identify or describe these methodologies, other
than identifying the sources presumably underlying Kohlmann’s
opinions, and noting that Kohlmann had “acquired a considerable
164
amount of information and documentation on these subjects.”
In assessing the reliability of his methods, Judge Kravitz described the
positive peer review of Kohlmann’s work but did not mention any
165
specifics. Judge Kravitz also quoted the opinion of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York in United States v.
166
Paracha, in which Judge Stein noted that Kohlmann’s work was
accepted within the relevant community and that it was employed by
167
experts permitted to testify in other such cases.
Relying on Judge
Stein’s opinion regarding Kohlmann’s methodology, Judge Kravitz
168
found Kohlmann’s methodology reliable.
169
Recently, in United States v. Kassir, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York again admitted Kohlmann to testify
about the origins, history, structure, leadership, and operational
170
methods of al-Qaida. The government charged Kassir with, among
171
other charges, establishing and operating terrorist websites to

sources, including a variety of original and secondary sources, cross-checking sources
against each other, and subjecting his conclusion to peer review . . . .” (citing United
States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *20–21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2006), aff’d, 313 F. App’x 347 (2d Cir. 2008))).
163. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125–26 (D. Conn. 2008).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 126 (noting further that Kohlmann’s work “receives a considerable
amount of peer review from academic scholars and others, and . . . is well
regarded”).
166. No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006), aff’d, 313
F. App’x 347 (2d Cir. 2008).
167. Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (quoting Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *20).
In Paracha, Judge Stein cited United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004),
for the notion that “[w]hatever the general pitfalls of the ‘vetting process’ that is
employed by Kohlmann and others in his field, it is a sufficiently reliable
methodology to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702.” Paracha, 2006 WL
12768, at *20 (citing Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 337).
168. See Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (finding, “in its role as gatekeeper,” that
“Mr. Kohlmann’s expected testimony me[t] the requirements of Rule 702”).
169. No. S2 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28837 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009).
170. See id. at *1 (denying Kassir’s motion to exclude Kohlmann’s testimony).
171. See id. at *2 (noting that Kassir was also charged with establishing a jihad
training camp in Bly, Oregon).
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provide material support to terrorists and al-Qaida.
At trial, the
government sought to prove that Kassir operated the websites
173
through an organization known as the Islamic Media Center.
174
Kohlmann’s thirty-page expert report follows the same pattern as
that described above. He begins with a twenty-page description of
al-Qaida’s evolution, its leadership (with a focus on Osama Bin
175
Laden), and its tradecraft.
Kohlmann then describes the Islamic
Media Center as follows:
The “Islamic Media Center” (IMC) is a “second tier” jihadi online
support group, dedicated to republishing terrorist propaganda and
glorifying the cause of the mujahideen . . . . Over the length of its
existence, the IMC has perhaps become most infamous for
distributing a massive, highly detailed archive of Arabic-language
terrorist training manuals over the Internet . . . . The manuals . . .
cover an extremely expansive array of topics—everything from
plastic explosives, to sniper tactics, chemical weapons, remote
176
detonators, urban warfare techniques, and car bombs.

Kohlmann goes on to quote several passages from the “Poisons
Handbook,” and he describes how the IMC “distributed a series of
video recordings of sermons given by extreme Salafi clerics known for
177
their support of Al-Qaida.” He begins his report by describing his
qualifications and by quoting the courts’ admissibility decisions in
178
Paracha and Abu-Jihaad.
In admitting Kohlmann, Judge Keenan relied heavily on the
rulings from prior Daubert hearings in Paracha and Abu-Jihaad. In his
opinion, Judge Keenan noted that in Paracha, the court “found that
Kohlmann’s reliance in part on secondary sources of information was
permissible because other experts in his field reasonably relied on
179
them.” Judge Keenan quoted extensively from Paracha, noting that

172. See id. at *3 (noting that the government charged Kassir with “using the
websites in a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure persons in a foreign
country,” and to “distribute information relating to explosives, destructive devices,
and weapons of mass destruction”).
173. Id. at *4.
174. EVAN F. KOHLMANN, EXPERT REPORT I: U.S. V. OUSSAMA KASSIR (2009), http://
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefakassirekexpert.pdf.
175. See id. at 2–20.
176. Id. at 20–21.
177. Id. at 24.
178. See id. at 2.
179. United States v. Kassir, S2 04 Cr. 356 (JFK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28837, at
*18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009), new trial denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83075 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 11, 2009).
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other courts had adopted that court’s reasoning.
The court
concluded that “Kohlmann’s expertise and reliability have not
diminished, and the standard under Rule 702 and Daubert remains
181
the same.”
Paracha, the case relied on by the trial courts in Abu-Jihaad and
Kassir, illustrates the courts’ typical review of Kohlmann’s
182
methodology. Several courts have relied on Judge Stein’s analysis
in Paracha to support their admissibility decisions.
In Paracha, the government prosecuted Uzair Paracha for his role
183
in providing material support to al-Qaida.
Specifically, the
government alleged that Paracha came to the United States and
184
To
posed as someone he knew was associated with al-Qaida.
establish its case, the government proffered Kohlmann to testify
regarding: “the origins and structure of al Qaeda, its leaders, and its
use of cells and individuals to provide logistical support”; “the roles of
other alleged al Qaeda members or associates mentioned by Paracha
in his statements to law enforcement officials”; and “al Qaeda
185
counter-interrogation techniques.”
At the Daubert hearing, Kohlmann described his methodology as
“gathering multiple sources of information, including original and
secondary sources, cross-checking . . . new information against
existing information and evaluating new information to determine
whether his conclusions remain consonant with the most reliable
186
sources.”
Defendant Paracha challenged this methodology as
180. See id. at *19 (citing United States v. Paracha, 313 F. App’x 347 (2d Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1582 (2009); United States v. Aref, 285 F. App’x 784
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 553 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Conn. 2008);
United States v. Sabir, No. S4 05 Cr. 673 (LAP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34372
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2007)).
181. Id. Judge Keenan did reserve judgment on whether to admit Kohlmann as
an expert in Forensic Computer Testimony. Specifically, Kohlmann sought to testify
about the link between the IMC and various email websites purportedly operated by
the defendant, and Judge Keenan scheduled a Daubert hearing for that issue. Id. at
*20.
182. Courts in both Kassir and Abu-Jihaad relied on Judge Stein’s opinion, as did
the court in United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
183. See United States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *6–7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006) (noting that Paracha was charged in a five count indictment,
including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and regulations issued under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b)), aff’d, 313
F. App’x 347 (2d Cir. 2008).
184. See id. Paracha allegedly obtained immigration documents that would permit
him to enter the United States, and he accepted up to $200,000 of al-Qaida funds
that he would invest in the business in which he was employed until al-Qaida needed
the funds. Id.
185. Id. at *18, *19.
186. Id. at *20.
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“a mere culling from a handful of cases and internet reports
187
But Judge Stein
information that the user deems reliable.”
disagreed, stating that “[w]hatever the pitfalls of this vetting process,
and obviously it is not the same peer review as in a formal academic
188
setting, it is . . . sufficiently reliable.”
The court found Kohlmann’s methodology “more reliable than a
simple cherry-picking of information from websites and other
189
sources.”
According to the court, the hearing demonstrated that
Kohlmann’s opinions and conclusions were subjected to various
forms of peer review, and that his opinions were generally accepted
190
within the relevant community.
Judge Stein noted that the facts
and sources underlying Kohlmann’s testimony, “although they do
include secondary sources,” were similar to those used by experts in
191
the particular field.
After a full-day hearing on Paracha’s motion in limine to preclude
Kohlmann from testifying, the court admitted him as an expert but
limited the scope of his testimony to: describing the origins and
organization of al-Qaida, identifying its leaders, and explaining its
192
tradecraft. The court allowed him to testify on the origin, structure,

187. Id.
188. Transcript of Hearing (Nov. 3, 2005) at 10, Paracha, 2006 WL 12768
[hereinafter Transcript].
189. Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *20.
190. In the transcript, Judge Stein does not mention the “academics and peers in
the field” who reviewed Kohlmann’s work; he only notes that “[Kohlmann]
explained the process by which his written publications are submitted for comment
and critique by academics and peers in his field before publication, and how his
postings on the internet, and presentations of public forums, are subject to review by
his peers.” Transcript, supra note 188, at 10.
191. Id. at 9. The court described Kohlmann’s sources as “the 9/11 Commission
report, confessions of al Qaeda members, information made available on the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, and original sources from terrorist groups.” Id. at 10.
Judge Stein described Kohlmann’s methods as similar to those used by a terrorism
expert in two prior cases: United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2005),
and United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 337 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded
on other grounds by 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), reinstated in relevant part by 405 F.3d 1034
(4th Cir. 2005). Id. Matthew Levitt testified as an expert witness in both Damrah and
Hammoud. See infra Part II.D (likening Levitt to a “fox” as opposed to a “hedgehog”).
192. Transcript, supra note 188, at 12. Judge Stein prohibited Kohlmann from
testifying about the two alleged al-Qaida operatives involved in the particular case,
finding that his proposed testimony was “too close to a summary of factual evidence
from sources that the government cannot introduce directly.” Id. at 12–13.
The court also prohibited any testimony from Kohlmann on any specific terrorist
plots—e.g., 9/11 and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—because the probative
value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. There
were no allegations in the case that the defendant had any connection to those plots.
See id. Judge Stein did allow Kohlmann to refer to terrorist plots generically “without
specifying individual plots and attacks.” Id. As Judge Stein clarified: “[Kohlmann]
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and leadership of al-Qaida, analogizing the need for expert testimony
in this area to that needed for cases involving organized crime
families (in which courts have permitted testimony about the
193
organization and operation of organized crime families).
The
court excluded his testimony regarding the roles of alleged coconspirators and regarding al-Qaida’s use of counter-interrogation
techniques because such testimony would intrude on the jury’s
194
function by summarizing factual evidence.
One court initially disallowed Kohlmann’s testimony but then
admitted it at the time of trial. Initially, in United States v. Amawi
195
(Amawi I), Judge Carr granted the defendants’ motion in limine to
exclude certain computer evidence obtained from them, not because
the court found Kohlmann’s testimony unreliable, but because the
court found that the testimony’s probative value was outweighed by
196
“the risk of very unfair prejudice.”
In that case, the government charged the defendants with
conspiring to kill and maim U.S. military forces in Iraq and with
197
providing material support to terrorist organizations.
The
government sought to admit Kohlmann to testify about a series of his
198
reports. The government offered two reports concerning “jihadist”

cannot talk about a plot to hijack 12 airlines or a plot to bomb embassies or a plot to
bomb the USS Cole. He can talk about terrorist attacks in general.” Id. at 13.
193. The court cited two mob cases, United States v. Gotti, No. S8 02 CR 743 (RCC),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21775 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004), and United States v.
Lombardozzi, No. S1 02 CR. 273 (PKL), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6562 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17,
2003), as support for its decision to admit Kohlmann. Yet, in both Gotti and
Lombardozzi, the expert’s knowledge (the same expert testified in both cases) was
experiential; he was a criminal investigator with the United States Attorney’s Office
testifying based on his thirty-five years of experience investigating organized crime in
the area. Gotti, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21775, at *3; Lombardozzi, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6562, at *5. Also, neither judge in the mob cases even mentioned the
reliability of the expert’s methodology; the courts’ gatekeeping dealt only with
relevance—whether the testimony would assist the factfinder. Gotti, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21775, at *14–15; Lombardozzi, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6562, at *13–14.
Therefore, the court’s analogy in Paracha is not particularly helpful with regard to
the reliability of Kohlmann’s methodology.
194. See Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *31 (noting further that the government
cannot present testimony aimed at guiding the jury’s determination of the credibility
of fact witnesses).
195. 541 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
196. Id. at 951.
197. Id. at 947. Additional allegations were that “two defendants unlawfully
distributed a video showing how to make a suicide bomb vest.” Id.
198. See id. at 948. The government offered five of Kohlmann’s reports:
two reports discussed video, audio, and written materials seized from the defendants;
a third report discussed a document called “39 Ways to Serve and Participate in
Jihad”; a fourth report discussed five photographs of Amawi; and a fifth report
discussed twenty-two training manuals found in Amawi’s possession. Id.
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materials, including “videos of acts of violence against members of
199
the American armed forces in Iraq.” In addition, the government
sought to have Kohlmann testify about the terrorist organizations’
use of the Internet as a tool for recruiting and training terrorists, and
200
general information regarding international terrorism.
Judge Carr identified Kohlmann’s principal occupation as
“collection of information—primarily from public sources on the
201
internet—relating to terrorist organizations and activities.”
He
found that Kohlmann was qualified to testify about the topics
202
described above “on the basis of his research, study, and analysis.”
The court nonetheless excluded his testimony on the grounds that
203
Judge Carr
the material, even if probative, was highly prejudicial.
found certain aspects of Kohlmann’s proposed testimony irrelevant:
“Bombs exploding, people being killed, and exhortations to violent
jihad speak for themselves, as do the other materials in the
204
government’s presentation.”
Ultimately, the court excluded
Kohlmann’s proposed testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence
205
401 and 402. The court explained that “[f]ew terms have a greater
inherent risk of prejudgment than terrorism, terrorist, jihad, and
206
Al-Quaeda [sic].”
The court in Amawi I did not address the
reliability of Kohlmann’s methodology.
Despite his initial ruling, in a later ruling, Judge Carr allowed
Kohlmann to testify, but apparently limited the scope of the
207
testimony.
Judge Carr noted that the parties were formulating
199. Id. (noting that the “jihadist” materials either came from the government’s
cooperating witness or were found during post-indictment searches of the
defendants’ computers and residences).
200. Id. at 952.
201. Id. at 947.
202. See id. at 949 (identifying specific areas in which Kohlmann is qualified to
testify, including such areas as “who has created and creates such materials, how they
use the internet to disseminate them[,] . . . the apparent purposes in creating and
distributing them and how internet users may be able to locate and access such
materials”).
203. See id. at 954 (stating that “little . . . could come from Kohlmann’s testimony
about the actual or relative comprehensiveness and size of the defendants’
downloaded collection”).
204. Id. at 950.
205. See id. (finding that Kohlmann’s testimony regarding “the source, nature, and
utility of the [computer] materials [was] not relevant”).
206. Id. at 951. The court also found the government’s reliance on organized
crime cases to be unpersuasive and inapplicable. Judge Carr noted the significant
difference: “In such cases, the government is attempting to show the defendant’s
connection with and role in the group. That’s not so here, where there is no basis
for connecting any of the defendants with a particular group.” Id. at 952.
207. See United States v. Amawi (Amawi II), 552 F. Supp. 2d 669, 672 n.2 (N.D.
Ohio 2008), new trial denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80988 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2009).
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definitions of various organizations and events relating to the case
208
that would be provided to the jury. He explained that the scope of
permissible testimony by Kohlmann would depend on the parties’
209
success at formulating those definitions.
In a recent case out of an Atlanta district court, the trial court
described Kohlmann’s methodology in greater detail than have other
courts in previous decisions (and somewhat differently from how
Kohlmann depicts his methodology in expert reports in other cases).
210
Specifically, in United States v. Ahmed, Judge Duffey denied the
defendants’ motion to exclude Kohlmann’s testimony, finding
211
Kohlmann’s method of “comparative analysis” sufficiently reliable.
According to Judge Duffey, Kohlmann divides sources into
categories: open (non-classified information from original sources,
like interviews), secondary (“original video and audio recordings,
books, magazines, and pamphlets written by specific individuals with
knowledge of open source information”), and tertiary (newspaper
212
and magazine articles “and other derivative publications”).
Then,
using his methodology of “comparative analysis,” Kohlmann
“compar[es] and contrast[s] sources against one another to form a
213
cohesive whole.”
One common thread in these admissibility decisions is that the
courts routinely backtrack to prior admissibility decisions as a means
of assessing Kohlmann’s reliability. A second common thread is that
none of the published opinions, with the exception of Judge
214
Keenan’s decision in Kassir, demonstrate that the court has probed
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 2009 WL 1370936 (N.D. Ga. June 1, 2009) (No. 1:06-cr-0147-WSD) (order
denying a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Evan Kohlmann).
211. See id. at 21 (noting that Kolhmann gathers a variety of information, explains
the different value of each piece, and synthesizes the information for his analysis).
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id. at 21. Although I am not a social scientist, I spent some time researching
whether social scientists use a comparative methodology that involves comparing and
contrasting sources as the court indicated. See id. at 22 (reasoning that the
comparative method used by Kohlmann is “identical to those [methods] used by
other experts in his field”). I found that social scientists do indeed employ such a
methodology. In The Comparative Method, Charles C. Ragin depicts the method as
one that involves comparing cases, such as historical events (the “case-oriented
approach”). CHARLES C. RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD 34 (1987). As Martha
Howell and Walter Prevenier explain in their book, historians certainly do compare
sources. See MARTHA HOWELL & WALTER PREVENIER, FROM RELIABLE SOURCES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL METHODS 69 (2001) (describing how historians use
source comparison, as well as other methods, to determine the authenticity of
sources and when to dismiss countervailing evidence).
214. See United States v. Kassir, No. S2 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28837, *19–21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009) (considering whether Kohlmann’s expertise
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into Kohlmann’s methodology to ensure that he strives to remain
objective (by, for example, carefully and methodically deciding when
215
While Kohlmann’s
to dismiss countervailing evidence).
methodology and conclusions may be sound in the sense that they
reflect the same intellectual rigor as others in his field, the published
Daubert opinions illustrate that courts accept his methodology and
conclusions “hook, line, and sinker” without any real scrutiny. This
allows Kohlmann to rely primarily on Internet sources without ever
having to explain to a court how he assesses the authenticity of those
sources.
C. Hedgehog Bias
Kohlmann certainly presents himself like Berlin’s hedgehog—
appealing to the media, juries, and judges with his single-minded
216
vision linking individuals to terrorism.
Yet, his single-minded
cognitive approach may certainly detract from his ability or
willingness to recognize contrary evidence or to accept alternate
217
explanations for an individual’s behavior. Accordingly, meaningful
gatekeeping under Daubert becomes crucial to ensure that
Kohlmann’s methodology is properly tested for reliability.
Kohlmann potentially presents a type of bias that is different from
218
the commonly discussed adversarial bias. The hedgehog’s bias does
includes Forensic Computer data collection), new trial denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83075 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009).
215. I reviewed court transcripts and Kohlmann’s expert reports submitted for
admissibility decisions. None of them demonstrate that the courts asked tough
questions, though the opinion in Ahmed, discussed above supra notes 210–213 and
accompanying text, reflects that the court at least ascertained, in some detail,
Kohlmann’s methods.
216. As courts continue to admit Kohlmann, with judges commending his
methods and qualifications, some commentators paint a different picture.
According to some, Kohlmann’s knowledge of terrorism is limited, but his
propaganda and his ability to scare jurors about terrorists are bountiful. See, e.g.,
CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES: A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA 27 (Marie Breen Smyth,
Jeroen Gunning, & Richard Jackson eds., 2009) (“Kohlmann skillfully mastered the
‘art of court diving,’ volunteering to become an expert witness for the prosecution
where he gains access to all discovery material, which in turn, through snowballing is
reused in his analysis elsewhere.”); Mills, supra note 134 (describing Kohlmann’s
methods as “scaremongering and blatant amateurism”).
217. This cognitive style does not have the same self-checking mechanisms as the
fox’s style, which is known for its self-doubts and self-reflection. See Gould, supra note
5, at 5.
218. See David Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of
the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456 (2008) (describing different types of
adversarial bias, including “selection bias,” which means that the expert “will
represent the perspective the attorney wants to present at trial”). Here, I am not
referring to the ordinary biases that every person possesses, or even to “adversarial
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not develop because one side has chosen and paid for the expert
219
(thus motivating the expert to testify for that party); rather, the bias
develops from the expert’s self-selection of the only side of the lawsuit
on which she would ever testify. I suspect that a hedgehog-type
expert, like Kohlmann, would never switch sides and offer testimony
on the background of terrorist organizations and recruiting methods
220
for an alleged terrorist because his life’s work is tracking terrorists.
I use “hedgehog bias” to mean unfaltering devotion to that one,
big, central idea that informs all of the hedgehog’s other ideas.
Presumably, the hedgehog is so enamored with her one big idea that
she instinctively dismisses all contrary, opposing points related to that
idea. The expert reshapes the data, sources, and facts to align with
221
her one big idea.
Thus, this bias impacts not only the expert’s
conclusions, but also how she processes the evidence to reach the
conclusion; it becomes part of her methodology. This type of bias is
presumably much more difficult for trial courts to discern (and even
for a skillful cross-examiner to discern) than bias that impacts only an
expert’s conclusions.
222
This is not about an expert’s personality. Rather, this is about a
223
cognitive approach that impacts an expert’s methods. Accordingly,
what is currently accepted—that juries (and presumably judges) are
224
drawn to charismatic personalities —should be amended to include
the idea that an expert’s single-minded cognitive approach may make
the expert come across as more trustworthy because she has neatly

biases”; rather, I am referring to a bias that results from a longstanding devotion to a
single idea that predates litigation. Such bias informs all the expert’s related ideas.
219. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (2008) (suggesting that a party selects a particular
expert to testify because the party expects that the jury will find that expert most
believable).
220. See Strauss, supra note 109 (implying that Kohlmann had a specific motive to
pursue his research on terrorists after 9/11).
221. Here, I rely on the work of Professor Dan Simon and Professor Tobin
Sparling for comparison. As discussed in more detail below, Simon describes how, in
the judge’s mind, “[t]he factual patterns, the authoritative texts, and the resulting
propositions are restructured.” Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 20 (1998); see also Sparling, supra note 18.
222. Other commentators have written on experts being charismatic, and thus
appealing to courts and juries. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan,
The Uneasy Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay and Introduction, 73 BROOK.
L. REV. 847, 853 (2009).
223. In a sense, it becomes the expert’s methodology because it seems impossible
to separate cognitive approach from methodology.
224. See Mnookin, supra note 219, at 1013 (noting that judges and juries tend to
believe experts they find impressive, not necessarily because they understand the
science).
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aligned all the data in her mind, possibly discarding countervailing
evidence.
Courts probably like hedgehog-type experts for the same reasons
225
that juries, the media, and lawyers do.
She presents herself with
confidence and charisma, and she explains her opinions with clarity
226
The hedgehog-type expert does not express selfand certainty.
doubt or uncertainty; accordingly, judges favor her. Commentators
have described the irony of the legal system’s disdain for
“uncertainty” with regard to scientific experts: “The legal system is
far more welcoming of dueling experts who reach opposite
227
conclusions than it is of consensus without certainty.”
Because of
these attributes, the hedgehog-type expert actually fits much better
within the typical model of judicial decision-making.
In a sense, hedgehog bias resembles that which Professor Dan
228
Simon describes as the judiciary’s “coherence bias.”
Judges aspire
to make decisions with certainty. When a judge is confronted with a
hard, complex case, the judge mentally “restructure[s]” the
arguments so that the judge dismisses all the points related to the less
229
favored position to arrive at a single, certain, favored position.
Professor Simon describes this shift toward closure as follows:

225. See id. This phenomenon is comparable to the outcome of the “Dr. Fox
study,” in which an actor portrayed a preeminent scholar who gave a lecture entitled
“Mathematical Game Theory as Applied to Physician Education” to a group of
psychiatrists, educators, graduate students, and other professionals. Deborah J.
Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 235,
242 (2008). Dr. Fox’s lecture was essentially nonsense, but the audience praised it
because of Dr. Fox’s style, presentation, and analysis. Id.
226. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 474 (1986) (relying on studies of cognitive styles in
which judges tend to seek “right” or “wrong” answers, as opposed to scientists who
“concentrate more on underlying concepts and gradations in correctness”).
227. Berger & Solan, supra note 222, at 852. The legal system’s preference for
experts who express their opinions with certainty also applies in the scientific arena.
Id. In their book about the legal system’s “idealization of science,” Professors Caudill
and LaRue explain why judges, at times, mistakenly admit bad scientists and exclude
good ones:
Science is thus not characterized by its objectivity and certainty—and
conclusions are seen as often tentative, contradictory, or probabilistic. . . .
This does not signal unreliability, but rather marks the typical conditions
under which natural and social scientists work to produce useful knowledge.
. . . [T]he reason why those judges did not recognize the practical goals and
limitations of science . . . was their idealized image of the features of the
scientific enterprise.
CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14, at 23–24.
228. See Simon, supra note 221, at 21 (explaining that judicial reasoning is
different from typical legal reasoning because, unlike lawyers, the judge has to make
a final decision).
229. See Sparling, supra note 18.
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[T]he judge’s mental representation of the dispute evolves
naturally towards a state of coherence. That is, the cognitive system
imposes coherence on the arguments so that the subset of arguments
that supports one outcome becomes more appealing to the judge
and the opposite subset, including arguments that previously
230
seemed appropriate, turns less favorable.

Simon illustrates in his research how the coherence model actually
results in decisions based on skewed mental models: “Due to these
coherence shifts, at the culmination of the process, the decision-maker’s
mental model is skewed toward conformity with the emerging
decision. As the hard case morphs into an easy one, the decision
231
follows easily and confidently.”
Judge Richard Posner described
judicial opinions as being “couched in a ‘vocabulary of apodictic
232
Thus, the judicial decision-making process impels the
certainty.’”
judge toward certainty, which the hedgehog-type expert provides.
D. Matthew Levitt—A Likely Fox
Though I chose to focus on the hedgehog-type expert because of
its awkward interplay with Daubert gatekeeping, the fox-type cognitive
approach also underscores flaws in Daubert. At times, the government
proffers two other experts to testify in criminal cases against alleged
terrorists, though with much less frequency than the government
233
proffers Kohlmann.
One of these experts, Matthew Levitt, is a
senior fellow and director of the Washington Institute’s Stein
234
Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy.
Based on only a
limited review, Levitt seems more fox-like. Levitt’s background is
academic and varied, with a master’s degree in law and diplomacy
235
and a doctorate from Tufts’ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Levitt has worked for the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where he focused on studying
230. Simon, supra note 221, at 20.
231. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 517 (2004).
232. Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 30 (1990).
233. The government has proffered expert witnesses Dr. Richard Tanter and
Matthew Levitt in these cases. See, e.g., United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373-CR,
2007 WL 5303052, at *1–6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2007) (offering Dr. Richard Tanter as
the government’s expert witness to provide information regarding the stages of the
“radicalization process”); United States v. Holy Land Found. For Relief and Dev.,
No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2059722, at *7–10 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2007) (offering
Matthew Levitt as the government’s expert witness to teach the jury about Hamas).
234. See Expert Biography for Matthew Levitt, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC10.php?CID=5 (last
visited on Feb. 3, 2010).
235. Id.
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fundraising and logistical support methods of terrorist groups in the
236
Middle East. He has studied negotiation, and he lists terrorism and
237
the Arab-Israeli peace process as areas of expertise.
During a roundtable discussion on counterterrorism assistance
programs, Levitt began his remarks by stating, “I don’t claim to be an
expert on the issue of capacity building or training assistance per
238
say . . . .” In addition, many of his PolicyWatch/PeachWatch articles
are titled as questions: for example, “Gaza: The Next Terrorist Safe
239
240
Thus,
Haven?” and “Iran Sanctions: Can They Be Effective?”
even with his language, Levitt presents himself as more open-minded
and receptive to the possible merit of opposing views. In one of the
cases in which the government proffered Levitt, United States v. Holy
241
Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the court excluded his
testimony because the government had not established the reliability
242
Specifically, the defendants had
of Levitt’s methodology.
“dissect[ed]” the authorities in Levitt’s book (on which he was going
to rely) and attempted to demonstrate that Levitt’s methodology did
243
not satisfy the intellectual rigor standard.
Although Levitt has strong qualifications in terms of social science
methodology, presumably, when testifying, he would be prone to
describing the ambiguities relating to his theories or conclusions.
Perhaps he would treat testifying more like classroom teaching,
where professors probe the uncertainties, thus making him less
attractive to courts and juries. In a sense, how courts treat experts
with more fox-like characteristics may be similar to what Caudill and
LaRue describe as courts’ “idealization” of scientific testimony—the
expectation that good science will always yield results with a high
236. Id.
237. Id.; see also MATTHEW LEVITT, NEGOTIATING UNDER FIRE: PRESERVING PEACE
TALKS IN THE FACE OF TERROR ATTACKS (2008).
238. Transcript of Remarks of Matthew Levitt, Reforming U.S. Counterterrorism
Assistance
Programs,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=
C07&CID=452 (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
239. See Matthew Levitt, Gaza: The Next Terrorist Safe Haven?, POLICYWATCH/
PEACEWATCH, June 29, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?
CID=2631.
240. See Matthew Levitt, Iran Sanctions: Can They Be Effective?, POLICYWATCH/
PEACEWATCH, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?
CID=2673.
241. No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2059722 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2007).
242. See id. at *8–9 (explaining that the court was not completely convinced by the
defense’s challenges to Levitt, but holding that the government had to provide more
than “unsubstantiated and unverified assertion[s]” to prove reliability).
243. See id. at *8 (noting that the defendants used the declaration of Professor
Charles D. Smith to depict the shortcomings in Levitt’s methodology).
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244

degree of certainty. Ultimately, regardless of whether an expert is
more fox- or hedgehog-like, the gatekeeping system needs to be
rejuvenated to account for the differences in how experts process
information.
III. PROPOSAL: REJUVENATE DAUBERT TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF
AN EXPERT’S COGNITIVE APPROACH
The goal of Daubert gatekeeping is clear:
It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
245
practice of an expert in the relevant field.

Thus, in assessing an expert’s methodology, the court should
consider an expert’s intellectual approach—not only what an expert
thinks, but how an expert thinks. This would require courts to shift
some longstanding presumptions. For instance, on remand in
246
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert II), Judge
Kozinski stated that when an expert testifies based on research he
conducted before litigation, this “provides important, objective proof
247
that the research comports with the dictates of good science.”
However, as shown herein, a lifetime of research in a particular area
may also signify a tendency toward devotion to an idea that taints the
expert’s analysis.
I do not recommend a major overhaul of Daubert but rather a
revitalization of the test to include certain presumptions (and to
eliminate certain previously held assumptions) and thereby ensure
that courts scrutinize methodology.
A revised and rejuvenated gatekeeping scheme would assist courts
in recognizing experts with hedgehog-type approaches, if, for
instance, the expert satisfies these criteria: (1) the expert always
testifies for the same side (or party) to a lawsuit in the same type of
lawsuit; (2) the expert has worked (outside of testifying) for the entity
on behalf of which she is testifying; (3) the expert has provided
expertise on the subject outside of court (e.g., in the media); (4) the
expert has spent considerable time studying/exploring the set of
ideas prior to litigation; and (5) the expert leaves no room for doubt
244. CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14.
245. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
246. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
247. Id. at 1317. Judge Kozinski went on to say that “experts whose findings flow
from existing research are less likely to have been biased toward a particular
conclusion by the promise of remuneration.” Id.
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(she expresses her opinions with an unfaltering sense of certainty).
This would turn the presumptions currently underlying Daubert
gatekeeping upside-down, as characteristics that previously supported
reliability of methodology would now be considered reasons to
closely scrutinize the expert’s methods.
If the expert meets these criteria, the court should investigate the
expert’s methodology to determine whether the expert is capable of
being even-handed with the evidence. For example, as a trial judge,
I would ask the following “tough” questions of an expert like
Kohlmann:
1. What, very specifically, is Kohlmann’s peer community? Is it
(a) those who track al-Qaida and its connection to Azzam
Publications on the Internet, (b) political scientists who study
international affairs and who specialize in terrorist organizations,
or (c) those who use Internet sources to track any type of
organization because the expertise actually involves the proper
collection of Internet sources?
2. Has Kohlmann published in “academic” journals alongside
political scientists who study international affairs, and what is the
reputation among peers of the blogs on which he frequently posts?
3. Should the court’s inquiry probe into Kohlmann’s use of
Internet sources and his expertise in deciding the authenticity of
these sources, what methods does Kohlmann use to authenticate
248
his Internet sources? And the follow-up question: What does the
community of “Internet researchers”—those who study and teach
how to authenticate Internet sources—think of his methods?
4. How does Kohlmann prioritize Internet sources in terms of
authenticity?
5. How does Kohlmann handle contrary evidence, for example,
evidence supporting the notion that Azzam Publications has other
primary functions, aside from recruiting terrorists, and that a
particular defendant has been engaged in this other function?
6. How have terrorist groups’ use of the Internet changed since
9/11, and how has Kohlmann reacted to this change?
248. This suggests an entirely different type of expertise—an Internet source
expert rather than simply an expert on terrorist organizations.
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Presently, courts do not ask these questions.
This proposal requires more than courts acknowledging
differences among types of potential experts and using those
differences to determine the proper gatekeeping test and degree of
scrutiny.
Courts presently distinguish between scientific and
nonscientific experts and then, within nonscientific expertise, courts
differentiate technical and experiential experts from academic
experts (notably, Kohlmann is not any of the above; he is self-made
249
based on studying a particular subject).
Courts should
acknowledge these differences because they relate to peer
community. The cognitive style of the expert—whether scientific or
nonscientific—is a more telling indicator of reliability of
methodology (and a reason to apply stricter or softer scrutiny) than is
the type of expert.
If investigating different methodologies is overly cumbersome,
special masters could be appointed to research and advise courts on
how to assess the methodology of a particular type of expert.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, a judge may appoint
a special master to recommend findings of fact in certain
250
circumstances. The master could check the expert’s description of
methodology to see whether it matches the “intellectual rigor”
expected in the field. Courts could obtain these masters from
professional organizations or academic institutions. Although it
251
would increase court costs (in terms of paying the master), it would
shorten the Daubert hearing and lessen the time the judge must take

249. See Victoria E. Brieant & William N. Hebert, Soft Science and the Courts After
Daubert: Non-Scientific Expert Testimony, SF78 ALI-ABA 111 (2001) (discussing how
soft-science experts are evaluated under Daubert, listing nonscientific or technical
disciplines as: “medical/mental health, engineering, accident reconstruction, police
procedures, fire/arson, economics, accounting, patents and trademarks, law,
appraisal, insurance, and securities”). The article did not include such disciplines as
political science, linguistics, or history. Id.
250. Rule 53(a)(1)(B)(i) permits judges to appoint a master to recommend
findings of fact on issues for the court to decide if “warranted by . . . some
exceptional condition.” The rule also provides for the appointment of a master to
perform an accounting or to “resolve a difficult computation of damages.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(ii). In Joiner, Justice Breyer suggested the use of special masters
to assist courts in understanding specialized knowledge pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 706. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
251. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(h).
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to research the methodology.
Accordingly, the overall process
would make the hearing more efficient and effective.
Thus, a rejuvenated Daubert test would involve a different set of
presumptions from those that currently exist. Primarily, judges
would focus on methodology, keeping that assessment separate from
qualifications. A judge would not assume that because an expert is
wholeheartedly devoted to a set of ideas, the judge should be equally
smitten by those ideas. Comparatively, though not the subject of this
Article, the fox-type expert should not provoke typical presumptive
responses from trial courts. Because the fox-like expert expresses a
lack of certainty and even some self-doubt, the court should not infer
253
that the expert’s methodology is untrustworthy.
A. Courts Should Determine and Apply the Most Fitting Set of Factors,
Given the Type of Expertise
Until the use of special masters takes hold, courts can themselves
determine and apply factors that fit the type of expertise. Judge
Irenas of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
254
attempted this in Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp., a products liability
255
action involving injuries caused by a forklift. Judge Irenas crafted a
particular gatekeeping test for the plaintiff’s engineering expert—a
256
“reconfigured” Daubert analysis fitting for an engineer. Judge Irenas
included the following factors in his test: (1) federal design and
performance standards; (2) independent standards organizations;
(3) relevant literature; (4) industry practice; (5) product design and
accident history; (6) charts and diagrams; (7) scientific testing;
(8) feasibility of suggested modifications, and (9) risk-utility of
257
suggested modification. Using these factors, Judge Irenas held that
the testimony of the expert lacked reliability, as the expert, for

252. See Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters in the Federal Courts Under Revised Rule
53: Designer Roles, SM051 ALI-ABA 1 (2007) (suggesting that the use of a special
master in a Daubert hearing would provide a decision-maker who knew the area of
science and would save time and money).
253. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14.
254. 148 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.N.J. 2001).
255. See id. at 540 (holding that an expert witness’s testimony was inadmissible
because the engineer consultant lacked “indicia of reliability”).
256. Id. at 532.
257. Id. at 533–36. Judge Irenas “culled” the factors from a nationwide search of
cases, mostly involving products liability. Id. at 532.
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example, “identified nothing in the literature which would suggest
258
peer review of his conclusions.”
Some commentators opine that no matter what test is applied, the
effectiveness of Daubert may not change. Edward Cheng argues for
independent judicial research because of flaws in Daubert
259
gatekeeping.
Specifically, he argues that, regardless of the factors
of the test, judges will continue to apply “some general level of
scrutiny to scientific evidence,” which often misapplies the Daubert
260
factors.
As Cheng’s article suggests, the degree of scrutiny and
proper application of the test is as important as the particular factors
261
of the test.
But given a fitting set of factors and an appropriate
degree of rigor, the court could simply test the logic of an expert’s
testimony against the expert’s stated methodology.
As one
commentator aptly noted, courts should be able to judge the
reliability of methodology and conclusions if such methodology is
described well:
[T]he judiciary’s expertise is in deconstructing an argument:
assessing the logic of the argument, the validity of its premises, the
rigor with which the witness applied the technique, the faithfulness
of the witness’s application of the methodology to her description
of it, the magnitude of the inference drawn by the witness in
forming her opinion, and the sufficiency of the facts to support the
262
inference.

The court should, with a proper set of factors, be able to
distinguish the expert whose big idea is not supported by a reliable

258. Id. at 538. Judge Irenas’s attempt to craft a suitable standard for the
engineering expert’s methodology, rather than simply rubber-stamping or excluding
the expert because of her atypical expertise, is commendable.
259. Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J.
1263, 1268 (2007) (arguing that such research should be required when judges face
new and difficult scientific issues).
260. Cheng illustrates the courts’ “patent distortion and misunderstanding” of
certain Daubert factors through his discussion of United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597
(7th Cir. 2001), in which the Seventh Circuit approved the lower court’s admission
of a fingerprinting expert because the techniques had been tested in an adversarial
setting and each result is verified by peer review, and United States v. Llera Plaza,
No. CR. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *10–11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), in which the
court rejected Havvard’s inaccurate description of fingerprinting. Cheng, supra note
259, at 1270.
261. Cheng, supra note 259, at 1268.
262. See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, supra note 29, at 2148 (distilling the
court’s gatekeeping role from several cases). Trial courts describe their quest as
ensuring the logic of the step from evidence to conclusion. See, e.g., Franklin v. Sheet
Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, No. 06-0004-CV-W-GAF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74742, at
*16 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (excluding an expert because of his failure to provide “a logical
course of evidence to support his speculative conclusion”).
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methodology from the expert who used a methodology similar to that
used by her peers outside of litigation.
Ultimately, courts should develop a suitable set of factors to test a
particular social science methodology. Courts should rely on
available resources like professional organizations to assist in
263
developing a standard. As described by Judge Brown, the standard
for reliability falls into three categories:
methodological,
264
foundational, and connective.
For each of these categories,
I present factors courts should use to assess trustworthiness; I also
present three factors (referred to as “bias indicators”) specifically
aimed at highlighting an expert’s potential bias.
1.

Methodological
a.

Response of peer review community

First, the court should identify the expert’s peer community.
The court can then assess whether the methodology and ultimate
conclusion or theory has been peer reviewed (and the result of such
review). The expert should provide both criticism and praise—any
commentary on the expert’s methodology should be offered. If the
peer review is written, the court should also consider how the journal
is used and how it is regarded in the peer community. Obviously, the
peer community should be the same one in which the expert works
outside of litigation.
b.

Dispassionate allegiance to professional standards

In the social science community, certain fields have professional
organizations with standards.
The American Political Science
Association, for example, may be able to provide standards for a
particular analysis. Courts should review these standards in deciding
whether the expert followed the proper methodology.
2.

Foundational reliability
a.

Method of selecting/verifying supporting evidence and documents

This factor has two aspects: how the expert selects which sources to
rely on, and how the expert verifies the authenticity of those sources.
263. For example, the American Political Science Association provides many
resources and conferences, including resources on methodology. American Political
Science Association Home Page, http://www.apsanet.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
264. See Brown, supra note 51, at 749.
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This becomes particularly important when the expert’s sources come
largely from the Internet.
b.

Treatment of contrary evidence or methodology
265

Because so much of social science (political science, history, and
anthropology) is based on document selection and interpretation,
courts should focus on this factor in assessing a social science expert’s
266
methodology. Experts should be required to describe and identify
sources contrary to their opinions and explain why they rejected
those sources. This factor takes on even greater importance when
the expert displays hedgehog-type characteristics.
c.

Whether the field of expertise is “known to reach reliable results” for
267
the type of opinion the expert offers in court

This factor sounds like the categorical review described above.
This Article does not directly address the merits of this type of review;
however, I certainly reject the notion that a court should admit an
expert in one case because another judge in a different case held that
her testimony was admissible. I also reject the notion that courts
should assess the reliability of a type of expertise (e.g., fingerprinting
analysis) and that such action fulfills their gatekeeping obligation.

265. In her note concerning the libel case brought by David Irving against
Professor Deborah Lipstadt, Wendie Schneider extracts from the judge’s opinion a
standard for historian expert-testimony. Wendie Ellen Schneider, Note, Past
Imperfect, 110 YALE L.J. 1531, 1535 (2001). Many of these factors are useful for social
science testimony generally. Schneider extracts the following rules from Judge
Gray’s opinion: (1) ”treat sources with appropriate reservations;” (2) refrain from
dismissing countervailing evidence without proper consideration; (3) be evenhanded and avoid “cherry-picking” the evidence; (4) indicate when speculating;
(5) refrain from “mistranslat[ing]” or “omitting” sections of documents; (6) “weigh
the authenticity of all accounts, not merely those that contradict her favored view;”
and (7) consider the “motives of historical actors.” Id. (citing Irving v. Penguin Books
Ltd., 2000 WL 362478 (Q.B. Div. Apr. 11, 2000)). For each rule, Schneider cites
parts of Judge Gray’s opinion in which he criticizes Irving for his one-sided approach
to his historical scholarship. Id. at 1535 nn.22–28. She describes the benefits of this
standard as follows:
It would discourage dismissal of evidence based simply on the historian’s
holding convictions about his or her subject matter; it would give judges a
more nuanced understanding of what historians should and should not be
expected to testify to on the stand; and it would combat the tendency of
historians on either side of a case to present unduly one-sided conclusions.
Id. at 1540.
266. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes (providing a similar, though
different, test: “Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative
explanations”).
267. See J & V Dev., Inc. v. Athens-Clarke County, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1226
(M.D. Ga. 2005) (providing an example for the application of this factor).
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Connective
a.

Ipse dixit

The court should assess whether the expert has unjustifiably
extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded
268
conclusion—the ipse dixit problem of General Electric Co. v. Joiner.
The court can simply decide whether the conclusion makes sense,
given the methodological steps.
4.

Bias indicators
a.

Context in which expert developed methodology/theory

Under this factor, the court should assess whether the theory,
interpretation, or methodology has been employed in a non-trial
269
(academic, for example) setting. Again this factor may now cut the
other way (suggesting a need to further scrutinize the methodology)
if the expert has made her life’s work of pursuing the ideas about
which she plans to testify.
b.

Overcoming bias

If the expert’s characteristics suggest a hedgehog-like devotion
toward a particular idea, the court should determine what steps the
expert has taken to ensure that the devotion did not skew her
methodology or conclusions.
c.

Subjective interpretation

If the theory clearly calls for a subjective interpretation (e.g., of the
meaning of a document), the court should acknowledge this and
adequately scrutinize the expert’s methodology to ensure that she
took steps to check (and double check) her objectivity in arriving at
270
her conclusions.

268. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
269. On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Daubert added this factor to the list:
whether the expert’s opinion was developed independent of the litigation or strictly
for purposes of testifying. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d
1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743
(3d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that an expert’s testimony is only admissible if the
research was conducted for purposes of the trial).
270. See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1311.
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B. At the Same Time, Courts Should Enforce Procedural Reforms to Ensure
Accountability and Transparency
In addition to the proposals described above, appellate courts
should require greater accountability and transparency from trial
courts. In No Magic Wand, Professors Caudill and LaRue describe
how appellate decision-making about scientific experts reflected a
more realistic approach to science than did trial courts’ admissibility
271
decisions.
Thus, the appellate courts reversed decisions in which
trial courts expected nothing less than certainty from scientific
272
experts.
This appellate review serves as a check on a trial court’s
idealistic (and, according to the authors, unrealistic) view of science.
This check requires trial courts to make detailed findings
(transparency) concerning each aspect of expert admissibility
273
(accountability). These findings would include a description of the
various factors the court used to test reliability and the specific
reasons for the court’s decision regarding reliability of methodology.
274
Thus, the appellate standard would remain abuse of discretion, but
the discretion would require adherence to certain requirements, like
making the findings described herein.
Finally, trial courts should also adhere to the proponent’s burden
of establishing admissibility, rather than setting a very low threshold
and then requiring the other side to establish the unreliability of the
expert testimony.
CONCLUSION
Much has been written on the merits and shortcomings of Daubert
and about experts and bias, particularly adversarial bias stemming
from remunerating experts and the parties’ zeal to win. Yet, little
exists (either with regard to trial practice or in a more theoretical
sense) about whether certain traits of experts tend to diminish the
efficacy of Daubert. In other words, perhaps we need to ponder not
only what is wrong with Daubert as a gatekeeping test and what courts
can do about it, but also how experts’ cognitive approaches impact
courts’ ability to assess methodology under Daubert.

271. CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 14, at 20–23.
272. Id.
273. See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, supra note 29, at 2150 (stating that
judges can take reliability determinations from the jury as long as judicial rulings
have “greater transparency and accountability”).
274. See Saks, supra note 104, at 234–35 (arguing that scientific rulings should
receive de novo review).
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Courts routinely admit Evan Kohlmann to testify as an expert
witness in very high-profile criminal cases against alleged terrorists.
Courts do so because Kohlmann presents himself as the “gold
standard” for counterterrorism expertise.
During his career,
Kohlmann has made it his life’s work to follow terrorist organizations
and gather data.
In his reports, Kohlmann links whatever
organization or website is at issue in the case (because of the
defendant’s alleged ties to that entity) to al-Qaida, Osama Bin Laden,
and terrorism generally; he does so with unfaltering conviction,
powerful language and imagery, and no room for doubt. As a result,
courts, attracted to Kohlmann’s certainty, admit him to testify about
these issues.
The missing piece in this seemingly perfect equation is a real
inquiry by courts into Kohlmann’s methodology. In only one
opinion does the court actually describe his methodology by name;
otherwise, courts merely accept Kohlmann’s description of his
method. In accepting Kohlmann’s method, courts lean heavily on
the fact that he has been engaged in this process since he was in law
school and that other courts have accepted his methodology. When
viewed through the lens of the fox/hedgehog dichotomy, courts’
current gatekeeping of a hedgehog-type expert’s methodology is
shown to have little substance and a great need for repair.

